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Abstract: Authenticated key exchange protocols allow two participants A and B,
communicating over a public network and each holding an authentication means, to
exchange a shared secret value. Methods designed to deal with this cryptographic
problem ensure A (resp. B) that no other participants aside from B (resp. A) can
learn any information about the agreed value, and often also ensure A and B that
their respective partner has actually computed this value. A natural extension to
this cryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging a shared
secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Starting from the famous
2-party Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol, and from its authenticated
variants, security experts have extended it to the multi-party setting for over a
decade and completed a formal analysis in the framework of modern cryptography
in the past few years. The present paper synthesizes this body of work on the
provably-secure authenticated group DH key exchange.
The present paper revisits and combines the full versions of the following four papers:
—E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, D. Pointcheval, and J.-J. Quisquater.
Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
In P. Samarati, editor, Proc. of ACM CCS ’01, pages 255–264. ACM Press, November 2001.
—E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, and D. Pointcheval.
Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange – the dynamic case.
In C. Boyd, editor, Proc. of Asiacrypt ’01, volume 2248 of LNCS, pages 290–309. Springer-Verlag,
December 2001.
—E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, and D. Pointcheval.
Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman key exchange under standard assumptions.
In L. Knudsen, editor, Proc. of Eurocrypt ’02, volume 2332 of LNCS, pages 321–336. Springer-Verlag,
May 2002.
—E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, and D. Pointcheval.
The Group Diffie-Hellman Problems.
In H. Heys and K. Nyberg, editors, Proc. of Selected Areas in Cryptography ’02, volume 2595 of
LNCS, pages 325–338. Springer-Verlag, August 2002.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The idea of modern cryptography is to identify cryptographic problems that need
to be solved and to provide a rigorous treatment for them. An essential problem
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in distributed computing (e.g, scientific and conferencing applications, Grid appli-
cations [Berman et al. 2003; Foster and Kesselman 2004]) is the ability to establish
a security context within which messages sent over the wire are encrypted and au-
thenticated. A cryptographic means to do that is to have the distributed system’s
components exchange a secret value and to use this value to compute the key-
ing material for a symmetric cipher and a Message Authentication Code [Bellare
et al. 1996; Menezes et al. 1997]. The keying material is set as the output of a
key-derivation function that maps the secret value to the (bit-string) keys of the
symmetric algorithms. All being considered, the critical step in the establishment
of this security context clearly remains the mechanism for exchanging the secret
value. This step is often carried via a DH key exchange [Diffie and Hellman 1976]
or, in the group scenario through its possible generalizations (see, e.g., [Steiner et al.
1996; Ingemarsson et al. 1982; Steer et al. 1988; Burmester and Desmedt 1994]).
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, as well as some generalizations, were
initially designed to protect against a passive adversary that only eavesdrops on
messages. However, when it comes to implement these schemes in a distributed
system’s security architecture a much stronger adversary must be taken into ac-
count. Hackers have a great deal of control over our Internet communications.
They can relay, schedule, inject, and alter our messages, or even try to impersonate
us via man-in-the-middle attacks. One way to prevent these active attacks is to
add authentication services to the group key exchange protocol. In spite of the ap-
parent simplicity of adding authentication services to a group key exchange, it is a
task fraught with many complications. Many authenticated key exchange protocols
were later found to be flawed and in some cases the flaws even took years before
being discovered (see for instance [Bird et al. 1991; Diffie et al. 1992; Menezes et al.
1997; Pereira and Quisquater 2001] and the discussion in section 1.3 below). One
way to avoid many of the flaws is to provide a formal treatment in the framework
of modern cryptography.
Active attacks are even easier to mount and more destructive as middleware
technologies enable the exchange of data among a large number of components
which form a multicast group [Amir and Stanton 1998; Birman 1999; Berket et al.
2002; v. Renesse et al. 1998]. These technologies provide asynchronous and reliable
communication channels to coordinate the distributed application’s components
spread on the Internet. Each component shares responsibility for parts of a task
and coordinates its efforts with the other components. In this environment prone to
faults (e.g. faults can result from host failures, network failures, network congestion,
CPU load, or malice) creating a security context —within which messages are
protected— is challenging as application’s components join and leave the multicast
group [Agarwal et al. 2001; Amir et al. 2004; Rodeh et al. 2001]. Accommodating
this dynamic membership means updating the secret value after each change in the
membership of the multicast group. This step is often carried via a dynamic group
DH key exchange [Bresson et al. 2001; 2002a; Steiner et al. 2000].
1.2 Contribution
The first contribution of the paper is to provide cryptographic experts with a
provable-security framework to assess the security of authenticated group key ex-
change protocols. The framework captures the adversary’s capabilities and defines
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the security requirements to satisfy. It is the result of three successive papers. In
the first one [Bresson et al. 2001], we have captured the characteristics of an au-
thenticated key exchange which allows a pool of participants, communicating over a
public network and each holding a pair of public/private keys, to agree on a session
key — these participants do not share any secrets before hand. In real life, however,
the membership of the group is not built once and for all but is built incrementally
as the network topology evolves [Agarwal et al. 2001; Amir et al. 2004; Rodeh et al.
2001]. Participants can indeed join/leave the pool at any time or the pool itself
can be split into disjoint components due to network faults or malice. Thus, in
the second paper [Bresson et al. 2001], we have equipped our framework with this
notion of dynamicity in the membership. This is done by enhancing the framework
with additional, atomic1 operations which enable the group to grow or decrease: an
authenticated dynamic group key exchange allows an existing pool of participants
to update the value of their session key after each change in the membership so that
this value is only known to the members of the newly formed pool. We note that
re-running the protocol from scratch is always possible, and hence the goal of such
operations is to provide an efficient means to update the existing session key into a
new one. Finally, in [Bresson et al. 2002a], we have captured the ability to initiate
parallel executions of a dynamic group key exchange; concurrency is an important
feature to consider when a key exchange is meant for practical use. An authenti-
cated group key exchange provides a set of participants with an interactive protocol
to exchange a session key and, therefore form a secure group. In real life, however,
the participants may be part of several pools at the same time and, therefore, may
need to run multiple key exchanges in parallel. Later on these participants may
close one session while keeping the others opened. As this simplistic scenario shows
concurrency introduces technical difficulties in the security analysis since an ad-
versary could inject data extracted from one execution into another one to defeat
the security of this later key exchange. Concurrent executions are more realistic
than sequential ones and must be included in a provable-security framework for
authenticated dynamic group key exchange.
In addition to the formal security model, the second contribution of this work is to
provide engineers with a generic authenticated group DH key-exchange construction
which once instantiated leads to the schemes of Bresson et al. [Bresson et al. 2001;
Bresson et al. 2001; 2002a]. The construction is described in terms of modules that
perform the key-exchange and the authentication operations. The modules can be
instantiated via processes [Bresson et al. 2001; Bresson et al. 2001] or hardware de-
vices [Bresson et al. 2002a] that use tamper detection to not reveal any information.
Embedding the critical cryptographic material in some hardware cryptographic de-
vices is at least as good as erasing secrets [NIST 1994; Palmer et al. 1998; Vedder
and Weikmann 1997]; cryptographers assume and usually do not explicitly state
1We do not deal with the cases where participants decide to halt during an execution of the
protocol itself. Our Join and Remove operations are simply formal tools to describe evolutions of
a group, step by step —by one or several members at once— and assuming each of these steps is
done using the appropriate algorithm. Premature halting during execution of such an algorithm
is not considered here (more precisely, it is not considered further than what the adversary can
basically do: block messages and turn into infinite time-out).
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that secrets are definitively and reliably erased (only the most recent secrets are
kept) [Crescenzo et al. 1999; Joye and Quisquater 1997]. In our security model as
described in [Bresson et al. 2002a], we have captured the adversary’s ability to gain
access to the internal memory of participants and incorporated in the framework
the action of erasing a secret. The generic authenticated group DH key-exchange
construction achieves in a provably-secure and practical way the security require-
ments specified in the framework. Provable-security is reached by constructing a
reduction showing that, in our formal framework, the scheme achieves the afore
mentioned security requirements under reasonable intractability assumptions.
1.3 Related Work
1.3.1 General issues. A comprehensive treatment of “Protocols for Authentica-
tion and Key Establishment” can be found in Boyd and Mathuria’s book [Boyd and
Mathuria 2003]. In previous papers [Boyd 1995; 1997], Boyd gave an overview of
key agreement issues; his work provides a high-level classification of 2-party and
multi-party key agreement protocols, and a discussion of their security, depending
on which class of function is used to combine the nonces of each party. More bib-
liography can be found in the Handbook of Applied Cryptography [Menezes et al.
1997]. It is important to distinguish two kinds of scenario: in the first one, key
distribution (also known as key transport), the key is chosen by a single party and
provided to the participants. In the case of key agreement (also referred as key
exchange), all users participate in determining the key value. In the present paper,
we concentrate exclusively on (group) key agreement.
1.3.2 Security models for group key agreement. In the framework of modern
cryptography one finds a formal model and security definitions for the task of
exchanging a secret value —the so-called session key—. Bellare and Rogaway pro-
posed a formal model wherein the instances of a player are modeled via oracles, the
capabilities of the adversary are modeled via queries to these oracles, and the secrecy
of the session key is modeled via the notion of semantic security [Goldwasser and
Micali 1984]. This model was originally used to analyze the security of methods for
key distribution [Bellare and Rogaway 1993a]. In [Bellare and Rogaway 1995], they
consider a three-party scenario, in the on-line TTP (trusted third party) setting, in
which an incoercible server is available to the parties; it has been later extended
to the public-key setting by Blake-Wilson et al. [Blake-Wilson and Menezes 1997;
Blake-Wilson et al. 1997] and a specific adaptation was done few years ago by Bel-
lare et al. in the password-based key exchange setting [Bellare et al. 2000]. Another
kind of security models is based on the multi-party simulatability technique, and
was initiated by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [Bellare et al. 1998]; further refine-
ments were proposed by Canetti and Krawczyk: in [Canetti and Krawczyk 2001],
they make use of the indistinguishability approach as proposed in [Bellare and Rog-
away 1995] to propose the notion of secure channels; then in [Canetti and Krawczyk
2002] they developed the property of universal composability (UC) of such chan-
nels. In 1999, Shoup [Shoup 1999] provided a technical modification of the original
work by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk, in particular he took into account several
corruption models in order to encompass the forward-secrecy property (which states
that knowing long-term keys does not help in compromising previously established
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session keys). Our treatment of the authenticated group key-exchange is derived
from the first kind of approach [Bellare and Rogaway 1993a; Bellare et al. 2000].
We provided the first formal security models and proven secure protocols in our
series of papers [Bresson et al. 2001; Bresson et al. 2001; 2002a].
1.3.3 Previous work on Group Diffie-Hellman. There have been several proto-
cols aiming to generalize the DH key exchange [Diffie and Hellman 1976] to the
multi-party setting. These were tackled by Ingemarsson et al. [Ingemarsson et al.
1982], Diffie et al. [Steer et al. 1988], Burmester and Desmedt [Burmester and
Desmedt 1994], and Steiner et al. [Steiner et al. 1996]. The use of “multiple-decker”
exponents in the protocol of Diffie et al. makes it difficult to reduce the security of
the protocol to the standard DH problem and, therefore, its security is heuristic. In
1996, Steiner et al. proposed a natural extension to DH, named the group DH key
exchange [Steiner et al. 1996] which in 2001 we enhanced with authentication ser-
vices and proved it secure [Bresson et al. 2001]. This authentication enhancement
and the formal model for its analysis are at the core of the present work. We note
that the works by Ateniese et al. [Ateniese et al. 1998; 2000] also aim at adding
authentication services to the schemes by Steiner et al., however the security proof
was only informal.
Previous to the work by Steiner et al., Diffie et al. [Diffie et al. 1992] presented the
STS (Station-to-Station) protocol, but this protocol does not cover concurrent exe-
cutions. Also, the well-known protocol by Burmester and Desmedt [Burmester and
Desmedt 1994] is a very elegant protocol, which interestingly achieves a constant-
round complexity. However, as shown by Just and Vaudenay [Just and Vaudenay
1996], it does not achieve key authentication.
1.3.4 Dynamicity for group key agreement. The notion of dynamicity in the
group membership was pioneered by Steer et al. [Steer et al. 1988]. Adding members
to the group is easy, but removing them is not. Steiner et al. [Steiner et al. 2000]
modified their original method for group DH key exchange [Steiner et al. 1996;
Ateniese et al. 1998] to easily add and remove members from the group. In addition,
Ateniese et al. [Ateniese et al. 1998; 2000] identified additional, useful security
notions for a group key exchange (such as Perfect Forward-Secrecy, Contributory,
Key Confirmation) and informally show how to enhance [Steiner et al. 2000] with
authentication. The present paper describes our contribution, based on their works,
in order to achieve provable security in dynamic groups [Bresson et al. 2001; 2002a].
Other researchers have proposed methods for dynamic group DH key exchange.
Perrig extends the work of one-way function trees (OFT, originally introduced by
McGrew and Sherman [McGrew and Sherman 1998]) to design a tree-based key
agreement scheme for peer groups [Perrig 1999]. However, this work lacked the
facilities for handling group partitions and merges. Further refinements by Kim
et al. [Kim et al. 2000; 2001] addressed these issues but do not specify a rigorous
security model for a formal proof.
1.3.5 Protocols’ complexity. The schemes we analyze in this paper are directly
derived from those by Steiner et al. and, thus, have linear complexity. For this
reason, it is not reasonable to use them at a large or even medium scale. However,
we emphasize that the main contribution of this work remains the formal model
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for provable security, and we insist that many recently proposed schemes for group
key exchange have been analyzed using our model (see, e.g., [Katz and Yung 2003;
Boyd and Nieto 2003]).
The round complexity of a key agreement protocol becomes critical at a large
scale. The paper by Becker and Wille [Becker and Wille 1998] also gave 1 single
round as an optimal lower complexity bound for multi-party key agreement. Joux
used pairings to design a one-pass 3-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange [Joux 2000],
but generalizing his construction with multi-linear forms seems to be hard [Dupont
and Enge 2002]. In 2003, Boyd and Nieto came up with a round-optimal proto-
col [Boyd and Nieto 2003], however, their solution does not provide forward-secrecy.
Secret-sharing techniques also give advantage to design methods for group key
exchange. Li et al. [Li and Pieprzyk 1999] proposed the first key-exchange method
based on secret-sharing; by using polynomial-secret-sharing tools Tzeng [Tzeng
2000] proposed a fault-tolerant protocol with constant-round complexity but in
which the message-complexity per user is proportional to the number of users.
Later Cachin and Strobl [Cachin and Strobl 2004] provide a formal analysis of an
(optimal) fault-tolerant scheme, in the framework of asynchronous reactive systems
(such as [Canetti 2000; Pfitzmann and Waidner 2001]). On the other hand, Bresson
and Catalano [Bresson and Catalano 2004] designed a scheme with both message-
efficiency and constant round complexity, but without fault-tolerance.
1.3.6 Using cryptographic hardware protections. We note that the use of crypto-
graphic hardware devices for session key distribution was already explore by Rubin
and Shoup [Rubin and Shoup 1996]. Even though a cryptographic method is proved
secure, security can sometimes be compromised when the method is incorrectly im-
plemented. Cryptographers assume (and usually do not explicitly state) that secrets
are definitively and reliably erased (only the most recent secrets are kept) [Crescenzo
et al. 1999; Joye and Quisquater 1997]. In our 2002 paper [Bresson et al. 2002a]
we incorporate the cryptographic action of erasing a secret. This allows us to con-
sider forward-secrecy issues: in the strong-corruption model as defined by Bellare et
al. [Bellare et al. 2000], in which the corruption of a player reveals his internal state
(including “ephemeral” data), one can prevent attacking the session key before or
after the lifetime of these data. When dealing with the weak-corruption model, in
which corruption reveals only the long-term key, we achieve Perfect Forward Se-
crecy: knowledge of a long-live key is useless for obtaining any past session key. Our
model assumes these critical data are embedded in some hardware cryptographic
devices which are at least as good as erasing a secret [NIST 1994; Palmer et al.
1998; Vedder and Weikmann 1997]. In other words, we offer a technological choice:
either the previously used data are tamper-protected or they are securely erasable.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the group DH assumptions and show how these assumptions relate to the DH as-
sumptions. In Section 3, we present our provable-security framework and abstract
out the functionalities of the authenticated group DH key exchange. In Section 4,
we describe the AKE1 method for authenticated group DH key exchange. In Sec-
tion 5 we show that it is provably secure in the standard model under the classical
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decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. We finally conclude the paper.
2. COMPUTATIONAL PROBLEMS
We first present the notion of group DH distribution and use it to define the compu-
tational and decisional group DH assumptions. Our adversary is time-constrained
which means that all the success probabilities and advantages —Succ(t, . . .)) and
Adv(t, . . .) respectively— represent the maximal probabilities over all the adver-
saries running in time t.
2.1 The Group Diffie-Hellman Distribution
Given G = 〈g〉 a cyclic group of prime order q, n an integer, In the set {1, . . . , n},
P(In) the set of all subsets of In, and Γ a subset of P(In) such that In /∈ Γ,
the Group Diffie-Hellman distribution relative to Γ is defined as follows (with the
convention that
∏
∅ xi = 1):
GDHΓ = {ViewΓ(x1, . . . , xn) |x1, . . . , xn ∈R Zq} ,
where ViewΓ(x1, . . . , xn) =
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γ
}
.
When there is no risk of confusion, we will simply describe the tuple View as a col-
lection of group elements (rather than a collection of pairs). Since this distribution
is a function of the parameters n and Γ it could be instantiated with any of the
following special forms:
—The Diffie-Hellman distribution: n = 2 and Γ = {{1}, {2}}.
—The basic trigon (see Figure 1): Γ has the following triangular structure Tn (which
is involved in the security of the group DH method [Bresson et al. 2001]):
Tn =
⋃
1≤j≤n
⋃
1≤k≤j
{ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ j, i 6= k}}
j = 1 {} S1
j = 2 {1} {2} S2
j = 3 {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} S3
j = 4 (= n− 1) {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} S4
j = 5 (= n) {1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 5} {1, 2, 4, 5} {1, 3, 4, 5} {2, 3, 4, 5} S5| {z }
basic trigon
Fig. 1. GDH-Distribution for the Basic Trigon (Example when n = 5 and Γ = T5)
—The extended trigon (see Figure 2): Γ has the following structure En (which is
involved in the security of the dynamic group DH methods [Bresson et al. 2001;
2002a]): it is similar to the above Tn structure but with an extended n − 1-th
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line.
En =
⋃
1≤j≤n−2
⋃
1≤k≤j
{ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ j, i 6= k}}
∪
⋃
1≤k<l≤n
{ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= k, l}} ∪ ⋃
1≤k≤n
{ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= k}}
{} S1
{1} {2} S2
{1,2} {1,3} {2,3} S3
{1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,5} {1,3,5} {1,4,5} {2,3,5} {2,4,5} {3,4,5} S4
{1,2,3,4} {1,2,3,5} {1,2,4,5} {1,3,4,5} {2,3,4,5} S5| {z } | {z }
basic trigon extension
Fig. 2. GDH-Distribution for the Extended Trigon (Example when n = 5 and Γ = E5)
—The Generalized group Diffie-Hellman distribution: Γ = P(In)\{In} is all the
proper subsets of {1, . . . , n} [Boneh 1998; Naor and Reingold 1997; Steiner et al.
1996].
2.2 The Group Diffie-Hellman Problem
Given an integer n and a structure Γ, a (t, ²)-Group Computational Diffie-Hellman
attacker (G-CDHΓ-attacker for short) for G is a probabilistic Turing machine ∆
running in time t that given a tuple from GDHΓ, outputs gx1···xn with probability
greater than ²:
Succ
gcdhΓ
G (∆)
def= Pr
xi
[
∆(ViewΓ(x1, . . . , xn)) = gx1···xn
] ≥ ².
The G-CDHΓ problem is (t, ²)-intractable if there is no (t, ²)-G-CDHΓ-attac-
ker for G. TheG-CDHΓ-assumption states this is the case for all polynomial t and
non-negligible ², for a family Γ = {Γn}n. If n = 2, we get the well-known Com-
putational Diffie-Hellman problem, for which we use the straightforward notation
SucccdhG (·).
2.3 The Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem
The decisional problem consists, informally, to distinguish between gx1···xn and a
random power gr. To that goal, we either add to the tuple View(xi) the “right”
value or a random one, obtaining two kinds of tuples View$ and View?. Thus it
leads to two additional distributions from the GDH-distribution:
GDH?Γ = {View?Γ(x1, . . . , xn) |x1, . . . , xn ∈R Zq} ,
GDH$Γ =
{
View$Γ(x1, . . . , xn, r) |x1, . . . , xn, r ∈R Zq
}
,
where
View?Γ(x1, . . . , xn) = ViewΓ(x1, . . . , xn) ∪ {(In, gx1···xn)}
View$Γ(x1, . . . , xn, r) = ViewΓ(x1, . . . , xn) ∪ {(In, gr)}
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Given an integer n and a structure Γ, a (t, ²)-Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman
distinguisher (G-DDHΓ-distinguisher for short) for G is a probabilistic Turing
machine ∆ running in time t that given an element X from either GDH$Γ or GDH
?
Γ
outputs 0 or 1 such that:
Adv
gddhΓ
G (∆)
def=∣∣∣∣Prxi [∆(View?Γ(x1, . . . , xn)) = 1]− Prxi,r [∆(View$Γ(x1, . . . , xn, r)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ²
The G-DDHΓ-problem is (t, ²)-intractable if there is no (t, ²)-G-DDHΓ-dis-
tinguisher for G. TheG-DDH-assumption states this is the case for all polynomial
t and non-negligible ², for a family Γ = {Γn}n. If n = 2, we get the well-known
Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, for which we use the straightforward notation
AdvddhG (·).
2.4 The Random Self-Reducibility Property
The Diffie-Hellman problems have the nice property of random self-reducibility.
Certainly the most common is the additive random self-reducibility, which works
as follows. Given, for example, aG-CDHΓ-instance with Γ = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2},
{2, 3}, {1, 3}}, View = ViewΓ(x1, x2, x3) = (gx1 , gx2 , gx3 , gx1x2 , gx2x3 , gx1x3) for any
x1, x2, x3 it is possible to generate a random instance
View′ = ViewΓ(x1 + r1, x2 + r2, x3 + r3)
= (g(x1+r1), g(x2+r2), g(x3+r3),
g(x1+r1)(x2+r2), g(x2+r2)(x3+r3), g(x1+r1)(x3+r3))
where r1, r2 and r3 are random numbers in Zq, whose solution may help us to solve
View. Indeed, given the solution z = g(x1+r1)·(x2+r2)·(x3+r3) to the instance View′
it is possible to recover the solution gx1x2x3 to the random instance View:
gx1x2x3 = z · (gx1x2)−r3 · (gx1x3)−r2 · (gx2x3)−r1 · (gx1)−r2r3
· (gx2)−r1r3 · (gx3)−r1r2 · g−r1r2r3 .
However the cost of such a computation may be high; furthermore it is easily seen
that such a reduction works for the Generalized DH-distribution Γ only and thus
its cost increases exponentially with the size of View.
On the other hand, the multiplicative random self-reducibility works for any
form of the GDH-problems in a prime order cyclic group. Given, for example, a
G-CDHΓ-instance with Γ = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}}, View = ViewΓ(x1, x2, x3) =
(gx1 , gx2 , gx1x2 , gx1x3) for any x1, x2, x3 it is easy to generate a random instance
View′ = ViewΓ(x1r1, x2r2, x3r3) = (gx1r1 , gx2r2 , gx1r1·x2r2 , gx1r1·x3r3)
where r1, r2 and r3 are random numbers in Z∗q . And given the solution K ′ to the
instance View′, we directly get the solution K = K ′δ, where δ = (r1r2r3)−1 mod q,
to the instance View. Such a reduction is efficient and only requires a linear number
of modular exponentiations, but is restricted to prime order groups. The latter
restriction is not so strong since these groups are anyway the usual ones, where the
Diffie-Hellman problems are the most difficult to solve.
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2.5 Relations among the Diffie-Hellman Problems
In our paper [Bresson et al. 2002b], we state several relations between all these
problems.
Theorem 1 – Intractability of GDDH. The intractability of the Group
Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is implied by the intractability of the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem. If Γ is either the basic trigon or the extended trigon, then
we have:
Adv
gddhΓ
G (t) ≤ (2n− 3)AdvddhG (t′) with t′ ≤ t+ n3tG,
where tG is the time needed for an exponentiation in G.
Theorem 2 – Intractability of GCDH. The intractability of the Group
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is implied by the intractability of the Com-
putational Diffie-Hellman problem and the intractability of the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem. If Γ is either the basic trigon or the extended trigon, then we
have:
Succ
gcdhΓ
G (t) ≤ SucccdhG (t′) + (n− 2)AdvddhG (t′) where t′ ≤ t+ n3tG.
The proofs of these two theorems are provided in appendix and were originally
published in [Bresson et al. 2002b]. More precisely, in the later paper, we have
identified formal criteria allowing us to define “good structures” Γ for which the
hybrid reduction above can actually be performed. The basic and extended trigons
do satisfy these criteria, and are thus considered as appropriate for the reduction
theorem.
3. MODEL
In this section, we describe our formal model, which is, again, derived from that by
Bellare and Rogaway [Bellare and Rogaway 1993a; 1995]. The formalism models
instances of players via oracles available to the adversary through queries.
3.1 Players
We fix a nonempty set U of N players that can participate in a group key exchange
protocol P . A player Ui ∈ U can have many instances; we denote instance t of player
Ui as Πti with t ∈ N. A given instance can be involved in at most one execution
of P . And for each concurrent execution of P , we consider the nonempty set I,
called the multicast group, made of players instances involved in that execution.
We emphasize that each set I is related to one unique execution of the protocol2.
Finally in a multicast group I of size n, we denote by I1, . . . , In, the indices of
players involved in this group; this allows to translate numbering of players into
numbering of instances involved in a given group.
As in previous works, there is in I a group controller GC(I) who initiates the
addition of players to the multicast group or the removal of players from the mul-
ticast group. The group controller is trusted to do only this; in our protocols, the
2That is, if players U1 and U2 are running two concurrent executions of P , the first one involving
instance Πt1 of U1 and instance Π
t′
2 of U2, the second one involving instance Π
s
1 of U1 and instance
Πs
′
2 of U2, then there will be two multicast groups to deal with: I = {Πt1,Πt
′
2 } and I′ = {Πs1,Πs
′
2 }.
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group controller is (essentially) the player instance with the highest index in U (see
details in section 4).
To properly deal with security issues, and for the sake of modularity, we will
distinguish two kinds of module each instance is given access to. First, there is
a secure co-processor (the Key Exchange Module — KEM) which performs (in
a tamper-resistant fashion) the cryptographic computations. Second, there is an
authentication device (the Authentication Module — AM) such as a smart card,
which due to its lower computational power, is only in charge of authentication
mechanism.
3.2 Abstract Interface
We define the basic structure of a dynamic group key exchange protocol. A dynamic
group key exchange scheme GKE consists of four algorithms:
—The key generation algorithm GKE.KGen(1`) is a probabilistic algorithm which
on input of a security parameter 1`, provides each player in U with a long-lived
key LLU . The structure of LLU depends on the particular authentication scheme.
The three other algorithms are interactive multi-party protocols between players in
U , which provide each principal in the new multicast group with a new session key
sk.
—The setup algorithm GKE.Setup(J ), on input of a set of instances of players J ,
creates a new multicast group I, and sets it to J .
—The remove algorithm GKE.Remove(I,J ) creates a new multicast group and
sets it to I\J .
—The join algorithm GKE.Join(I,J ) creates a new multicast group and sets it to
I ∪ J .
An execution of P consists of running the GKE.KGen algorithm once, and then
many concurrent executions of the three other algorithms. We will also use the term
operation to mean one of the algorithms: GKE.Setup, GKE.Remove or GKE.Join.
Whenever a membership operation is performed on a multicast group I, we are
going to create a new instance for each player in the resulting multicast group, say
J ; in other words, the multicast group I continues to live (with its own session
key), while the new multicast group J is being constructed. Players instances in
I continue to execute their own processes (e.g., answering the queries asked by
the adversary), and newly created instances run independent processes in J . We
emphasize that the multicast group creation is a monotone process: once created,
a group continues to live until the end of the game. In particular, if a player joins a
group I (therefore creating a group J ) and then leaves the group J , the resulting
multicast group is not I, but a newly created one I ′ (even if its membership is
identical to I from the player point of view, they are made of different instances).
3.3 Security Model
The adversary A is given access to the oracles and interacts with them via the
queries described below. We explain the capabilities that each kind of query cap-
tures:
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These oracles provide the adversary with the ability to initialize a multicast group
via Setup-queries, add players to the multicast group via Join-queries, and remove
players from the multicast group via Remove-queries. By making these queries
available to the adversary at any time we provide it with the ability to generate
concurrent changes in the membership. We also take into account hardware devices
and model their interactions with the adversary via specific queries.
3.3.1 Queries to Players Instances. We define the oracle queries as the interac-
tions between A and the oracles only. These queries model the attacks an adversary
could mount through the network.
—Send(ΠtU ,m): This query models A sending messages to instance oracles. A gets
back from its query the response which ΠtU would have generated in processing
message m according to P .
—Setup(J ), Remove(I,J ), or Join(I,J ): These queries model the adversary A
initiating one of the operations GKE.Setup, GKE.Remove or GKE.Join. Adver-
sary A gets back the flow initiating the execution of the corresponding operation.
Note that combined with Send-queries, these 3 operation queries are enough to
model both passive and active attacks. While they only send back the flow
initiating the actual operation, the answer can be forwarded to the appropriate
player, which answer is also forwarded, etc. This way, passive attacks can be
modeled. Of course, the adversary can alter the message before forwarding it,
which models active attacks.
—Reveal(ΠtU ): This query models the attacks resulting in the loss of the session
key computed by oracle ΠtU ; it is only available to A if oracle ΠtU has computed
its session key sktU (Π
t
U has set its flag accept to true). A gets back sktU which is
otherwise hidden.
3.3.2 Corruption Capabilities. The adversary A can bypass the tamper detec-
tion mechanisms [Weingart 2000], through physical or side-channel attacks. Such
capabilities are modeled via the following two queries:
—Corruptam(U): This query models A corrupting the authentication module (the
smart card). A gets back the player’s LL-key.
—Corruptkem(ΠtU ): This query models A corrupting the key exchange module (the
secure co-processor). A gets back the private memory of the instance. This query
is only available in the strong-corruption model (see below).
3.4 Security Notions
The main security requirement for a secure group key exchange method to achieve
is “implicit” authentication. In Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE for brevity),
each party is assured that no other party aside from the intended pool of players
can learn any information about the session key. An additional security notion
is “explicit” authentication or key confirmation often both referred to as Mutual
Authentication (MA for brevity). MA should not be mistaken for the liveness
property which provides guarantees on the delivery of messages [Backes and Cachin
2003; Chockler et al. 2001]. MA ensures each player that his partners (or pool
thereof) have actually computed the shared session key.
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In the following, we only focus on the AKE notion only, since this is the most
important one. Furthermore, classical techniques are known to enhance it with
MA, such as additional key confirmation rounds.
3.4.1 Partnering. The partnering captures the intuitive notion that the in-
stances with which a given instance Π has exchanged messages in executing an
operation, correspond to players with which Π believes it has established a session
key. Another simple way to understand the notion of partnering is that an instance
Π′ is a partner of Π in the execution of an operation, if Π and Π′ have directly
exchanged messages or there exists some sequence of instances that have directly
exchanged messages from Π to Π′.
More formally, let us first denote by SIDS(Π) the set of all the significant flows
sent and received by Π before acceptance (flag accept set to true). By significant
flows, we mean flows with high entropy and thus specific to the execution of the
actual protocol. A first round of nonces is often used to introduce high entropy and
to avoid to make players, from different executions, partners.
In an execution of P , we say that two instances Π and Π′ are directly partnered
if both instances accept and SIDS(Π) ∩ SIDS(Π′) 6= ∅ holds. We denote the direct
partnering as Π↔ Π′.
We also say that instances Π and Π′ are partnered if they both accept and if, in
the graph GSIDS = (V,E) where V = {ΠtU : U ∈ U , t ∈ N} and E = {(ΠtU ,Πt
′
U ′) :
ΠtU ↔ Πt
′
U ′} the following holds:
∃k > 1, (Π1,Π2, . . . ,Πk) with
 Π1 = Π,Πi−1 ↔ Πi for i = 1, . . . , kΠk = Π′.
We denote this partnering as Π! Π′.
We complete in polynomial time (in |V |) the graph GSIDS to obtain the graph of
partnering: GPIDS = (V ′, E′), where V ′ = V and E′ = {(ΠtU ,Πt
′
U ′) : Π
t
U! Πt
′
U ′},
and then define the partner identities for oracle Π as:
PIDS(Π) = {Π′ : Π′! Π}.
3.4.2 Semantic Security. The Test-query. This query, that we denote Test(ΠtU ),
models the semantic security of the session key sktU . It is asked only once in the
following AKE attack game, and is meaningful only if oracle ΠtU is still Fresh at
the end of the game (which informally means that the session key is not trivially
known to the adversary, and it will be defined more formally below). The query is
answered according to a private (i.e., out of A’s view) bit b. If b = 0, a random
`-bit string is returned; if b = 1, the session key sktU is returned. We use this query
to define A’s advantage.
AKE Security. The security definition for P takes place in the following game,
denoted Gameake(A, P ). The game is initialized by providing coin tosses to A,
GKE.KGen(·) and any oracle ΠtU and by running GKE.KGen(1`) to set up players’
LL-keys. A bit b is as well flipped to be later used in the Test-query. Then, the
adversary starts interactions with the players instances: he can ask Send, Setup,
Join, Remove, Reveal queries, as well as, depending on the considered corruption
model, Corrupt-queries; in addition, A can ask at most one Test-query, but at any
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time of its choice. When A terminates it outputs a bit b′. We say that A wins
the AKE game if b = b′ and the “Test-ed” instance is still Fresh (see below). Note,
A can trivially win with probability 1/2, and thus we define A’s advantage by
AdvakeP (A) = 2 × Pr[b = b′] − 1. Protocol P is an (t, ²)-secure AKE protocol if
AdvakeP (A) is lower than ² for all adversary A running in time t.
3.4.3 Freshness. As already introduced, the freshness formalizes the fact that
the session key is not obviously known by the adversary through basic means. On
top of this, and because the corruption capabilities of an adversary can make him
learn the session key trivially, the definition is relevant to the notion of forward-
secrecy: forward-secrecy entails that the corruption of a player does not compromise
the previously established session keys. However while a corruption may have ex-
posed the long-term key of a player it may have also exposed the player’s internal
data3 (for instance, an ephemeral, private GDH exponent). We hence define several
flavors of freshness, depending on which corruptions are allowed.
1. scenario without any Corrupt-query. We say that an oracle ΠtU is Fresh,
in the current execution, (or holds a Fresh sk) if (1) ΠtU has accepted, and (2)
neither him nor his partners has been asked for a Reveal-query.
2. standard corruption model. Here the adversary has the ability to make
Corruptam-queries only. We use this model when dealing with (perfect) forward
secrecy, which we refer to as fs. We say that an oracle ΠtU is fs-Fresh, in the current
execution, if: (1) ΠtU has accepted, (2) neither Π
t
U nor his partners has been asked
for a Reveal-query, and (3) no Corruptam-query has been made (to U or his partners)
by A before ΠtU accepted (no Corruptkem-query is allowed at all).
3. strong-corruption model. Here the adversary has the ability to make both
Corruptam and Corruptkem-queries. We use this model when considering strong for-
ward secrecy, which we refer to as sfs. We say that an oracle ΠtU is sfs-Fresh, in the
current execution, if: (1) ΠtU has accepted, (2) neither Π
t
U nor his partners have
been asked for a Reveal-query, and (3) neither Corruptam-query has been made (to
U or his partners) by A before ΠtU accepted nor a Corruptkem-query has been made
to ΠtU by A.
At an intuitive level, the standard corruption model is to be used when ephemeral
data are protected in a tamper-resistant device: the adversary cannot see them.
On the other hand, considering the strong corruption model allows to deal with
scenarios in which the adversary can obtain ephemeral data, however if we want
to limit the damages of such leakage of information, we need to assume that these
data are securely erased once they are not useful anymore.
Remark 3. In the definition of freshness, one can note that only Reveal-queries
can later change the status of freshness of a key (or an instance): any Corrupt-query
does not change anything when the key is agreed on. However, if the adversary
asks a Reveal-query to the instance, or any of his partners, the instance is not
3Remind that the freshness notion is relative to an instance, not to a player. And in a concurrent
setting, each Join/Remove operation results in creating a new multicast group with a new session
key; that later, however, is typically updated from the previous one using these internal data, and
hence the corruption should distinguish whether these data are revealed or not.
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fresh anymore. This is the reason why it is essential for the partnering to be a
public relation so that the adversary is aware of altering the freshness when asking
a Reveal-query.
4. AUTHENTICATED GROUP DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROTOCOL
We describe the authenticated group DH protocol, which was formerly presented
in our previous paper [Bresson et al. 2002a]4 under the name AKE1, by splitting it
into functions that help us to implement the GKE abstract interface. These func-
tions specify in a modular way how cryptographic transformations are performed,
and abstract out the details the transformations. In the following we identify the
multicast group to the set of indices (instances of players) in it. We use a security
parameter ` and, to make the description easier, see a player Ui not involved in the
multicast group as if his private exponent xi were equal to 1.
4.1 Overview
The protocol AKE1 consists of the Setup, Remove and Join algorithms. As illus-
trated in Figures 4, 5 and 6, in AKE1 the players are arranged in a ring and the
instance with the highest-index in the multicast group I is the group controller
GC(I): GC(I) = ΠtIn for some t, if n is the size of the multicast group. When
some players ask to join the group the Group Controller initiates the protocol with
the joining players; when some players are leaving, the remaining player with the
highest index is the new Group Controller and performs the broadcast to update
the group key. Even if it is not said precisely in the description of the algorithms,
each instance saves the set of values it receives in the down-flow broadcast of Setup,
Remove and Join: In the subsequent removal of players from the multicast group,
any oracle Π could be selected as the group controller GC and so will need these
values to execute Remove (that is, to generate a new broadcast from the saved one).
The session-key space SK associated with the protocol AKE1 is {0, 1}` equipped
with a uniform distribution. The arithmetic is in a group G = 〈g〉 of prime order q
in which the DDH assumption holds.
4.2 Authentication Module
The Authentication Mechanism Auth supports the following functions:
—Auth.KGen(1k, i, j). This function, from the given security parameter 1k, gen-
erates a pair of keys, which is either a pair of matching public/secret keys
(PKi,SKi) for player Ui, or a symmetric key Kij = PKij = SKij between a
sender Ui and a receiver Uj . The secret keys are never exposed.
—Auth.Sign(i, j,m). This function authenticates a message m between a sender
Ui and a receiver Uj , by using the authentication key SKij . It returns an au-
thenticated data that is denoted µ = [m]ij .
—Auth.Ver(i, j,m, µ). This function checks whether µ is an authenticator on mes-
sage m from a sender Ui to a receiver Uj with respect to the verification key
PKij . The boolean answer is returned.
4The initial formal model in [Bresson et al. 2001; Bresson et al. 2001] enabled us to propose a
first protocol named AKE1. This was later refined in [Bresson et al. 2002a].
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The two latter functions should of course be called after initializing the keys via
Auth.KGen(·). Then we define the notion of signing oracle. An Auth.Sign-oracle
for messages authentication is an oracle that takes as input two indices i and j and
a message m, and returns an authenticator data µ = [m]ij using the authentication
key generated by Auth.KGen(1k, i, j).
Definition 1 – Chosen Message, Existential Unforgeability. A (t, q,
²)-Auth-forger F is a probabilistic Turing machine running within time t that re-
quests an Auth.Sign-oracle up to q messages (and for any pair of indices), and
outputs (m,µ, i, j) where m is a message authenticated by µ = [m]i,j, and without
having queried the Auth.Sign-oracle on message m, with the corresponding entities
(i, j), with probability at least ². We denote this success probability as Succcmaauth(t, q),
where CMA stands for (adaptive) Chosen-Message Attack. The Auth scheme is
(t, q, ²)-CMA-secure if there is no (t, q, ²)-Auth-forger.
Any appropriate signature scheme Sign or message authentication code MAC can
be used.
4.3 Key Derivation
Informally, a Key Derivation Function (KDF for short) is defined as follows:
—A function KDF, that given a string x sampled from an arbitrary distribution,
together with a uniformly distributed randomizer, outputs a string of a fixed
length.
Clearly, in the random oracle model [Bellare and Rogaway 1993b], a hash function
is a perfect key derivation function, however it does not provide the same level of
security as a proof in the standard model [Canetti et al. 1998]. In the standard
model, KDF has to be implemented with more sophisticated tools, such as the
left-over-hash lemma [H˚astad et al. 1999] with authenticated randomness, or a
deterministic randomness extractor, to obtain (almost) uniformly distributed values
over {0, 1}`.
4.4 Key-Exchange Module
The Key-Exchange Mechanism supports the following functions. They are essen-
tially performed in the secure co-processor, out of which the ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman exponent should not leak; most of them, however, invoke the Authenti-
cation Mechanism functions, which means that communication between these two
devices are assumed. The content of these communications is subject to attacks
when considering the strong corruption model.
The following functions help to build the trigon of successive flows that will be
sent in the protocol, as shown in Figure 3. One may use these functions to pick a
private exponent (gdh picks(·) and gdh picks?(·)), to go through the lines of the
trigon (gdh up(·)), to return the values needed to compute the key (gdh down(·)),
to restart going through the lines (gdh up again(·)), to return needed values again
(gdh down again(·)), and to compute the key itself (gdh key(·)).
—gdh picks(i). This function generates a new private exponent xi
R← Z?q . It also
erases any previous exponent x′i. However, note that xi is never exposed.
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¯
gdh down
| {z } | {z }
Y =⇒ Y ′ Z ⇒ Z′
Fig. 3. Successive flows, when n = 4
—gdh picks?(i). This function invokes gdh picks(i) to generate xi but does not
delete the previous private exponent x′i. The latter exponent x
′
i is only deleted
when explicitly asked for by the instance.
—gdh up(i, j, k,Fl, µ). This function forwards the successive values in the group
by performing the following steps.
(1) if j > 0, the authenticity of tag µ on message Fl is checked with Auth.Ver(j, i,
Fl, µ); if the verification fails, the protocol stops.
(2) Fl is parsed as a set of intermediate values (I, Y, Z) where I is the multicast
group and
Y =
⋃
k=1,...,i−1
{
Z1/xk
}
with Z = g
Qi−1
k=1 xk .
Then the values in Y are raised to the power of xi and then concatenated
with Z to obtain these intermediate values
Y ′ =
⋃
k=1,...,i−1
{
Zxi/xk
} ∪ {Z} = ⋃
k=1,...,i
{
Zxi/xk
}
=
⋃
k=1,...,i
{
Z ′1/xk
}
,
where Z ′ = Zxi = g
Qi
k=1 xk .
(3) Fl′ = (I, Y ′, Z ′) is authenticated, by invoking Auth.Sign(i, k,Fl′) to obtain
tag µ′. The flow (Fl′, µ′) is returned.
—gdh down(i, j,Fl, µ). This function prepares the set of values to be broadcasted
by performing the following steps.
(1) the authenticity of (Fl, µ) is checked, by invoking Auth.Ver(j, i,Fl, µ); if the
verification fails, the protocol stops.
(2) the flow Fl′ is computed as in gdh up, from Fl = (I, Y, Z) but without the
last element Z ′ (i.e., Fl′ = (I, Y ′)).
(3) the flow Fl′ is appended tags µ1, . . . , µn by invoking Auth.Sign(i, k,Fl′),
where k ranges in I. The tuple (Fl′, µ1, . . . , µn) is returned.
—gdh up again(i, k,Fl = (I, Y ′)). This function restarts the process by refreshing
the i-th line as follows. From Y ′ and the previous random x′i, one can recover
the associated Z ′ (by raising the last component of Y ′ to the power of x′i). In
this tuple (Y ′, Z ′), one replaces the occurrences of the old random x′i by the new
one xi (by raising some elements to the power xi/x′i) to obtain Fl
′. The latter
is authenticated by computing a tag µ′ via Auth.Sign(i, k,Fl′). The pair (Fl′, µ′)
is returned. From now the old random x′i is no longer needed and, thus, can be
erased.
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—gdh down again(i,Fl = (I, Y ′)). This function refreshes the set of values to
be broadcasted as follows. In Y ′, one replaces the occurrences of the old random
x′i by the new one xi, to obtain Fl
′. This flow is appended tags µ1, . . . , µn by
invoking Auth.Sign(i, k,Fl′), where k ranges in I. The tuple (Fl′, µ1, . . . , µn) is
returned. From now the old random x′i is no longer needed and, thus, can be
erased.
—gdh key(i, j,Fl, µ) produces the session key sk. First, the authenticity of the
flow (Fl, µ) is checked with Auth.Ver(j, i,Fl, µ). Second, the value α = g
Q
j∈I xj
is computed from the private exponent xi, and the corresponding value in Fl.
Third, sk is defined to be KDF(I‖Fl‖α).
Intuitively, the basic protocol runs as follows. Each successive player will use
gdh picks to get its own private exponent, gdh up to embed it in the received
values and to forward the new values to the next player; this process starts from
an empty set of values. The last player then will use gdh down to broadcast the
sufficient information such that each player can compute the key, using gdh key.
When one (or more) player(s) want(s) to join the group, the last player in the
current group refreshes its private exponent with gdh picks? and restarts sending
successive values via gdh up again. The joining players will use gdh up to embed
their contribution until the last joining player. The latter will broadcast, as previ-
ously, a set of values using gdh down. When one (or more) player(s) want(s) to
leave the group, the highest-index remaining player refreshes its private exponent
with gdh picks? and will use gdh down again to generate a new broadcast such
that the other remaining players can compute the key (via gdh key) and then set
the accept flag to true. A more formal description is given below.
4.5 Setup(I)
This algorithm consists of two stages: the up-flow and the down-flow (see Figures 3
and 4). Remind that Ii denotes the index (in U) of the i-th oracle instance involved
in I. Let n be the number of instances in I.
One starts with the convention I0 = 0, Fl0 = (I, {g}) and µ0,i = ∅. Then, on
the up-flow, each oracle ΠtIi for i = 1, . . . , n invokes gdh picks(Ii) to generate its
private exponent xIi and then (only if i ≤ n − 1) invokes gdh up(Ii, Ii−1, Ii+1,
Fli−1, µi−1,i) to obtain both flow Fli and tag µi,i+1. Then, ΠtIi forwards (Fli, µi,i+1)
to the next oracle in the ring. The down-flow takes place when GC(I) receives the
last up-flow. Upon receiving this flow, GC(I) invokes gdh down(In, In−1,Fln−1,
µn−1,n) to compute both Fln and the tags µ1, . . . , µn. GC(I) broadcasts (Fln, µ1,. . . ,
µn). Finally, each oracle ΠtIi invokes gdh key(Ii, In,Fln, µi) and gets back the
session key sktIi (and accepts the session).
To illustrate this, assume U2, U4 and U6 do run the algorithm. We have then
I1 = 2, I2 = 4, I3 = 6; we slightly abuse the notation and denote for all of them
the session by t so that I = {Πt2,Πt4,Πt6}. The protocol starts by having Πt2
choosing x2 and, from (2, 0, 4, (I, {g}), ∅), generates Fl1 = (I, {g, gx2}) together
with an authenticator µ12. The second player instance Πt4 chooses x4 and gener-
ates from (4, 2, 6,Fl1, µ12) the values Fl2 = (I, {gx4 , gx2 , gx2x4}) and µ23. Finally
Πt6 generates the broadcast via gdh down(6, 4,Fl2, µ23) = Fl3, µ31, µ32, µ33 where
Fl3 = (I, {gx4x6 , gx2x6 , gx2x4}). The instance Πt2 and Πt4 compute the session key
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→ x1 → x2 → x3 → x4
l l l l
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
accept← 0 accept← 0 accept← 0 accept← 0
gdh up(1, 0, 2, I‖g, ∅)
(Fl1,µ12)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
gdh up(2, 1, 3,Fl1, µ12)
(Fl2,µ23)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
gdh up(3, 2, 3,Fl2, µ23)
(Fl3,µ34)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
gdh down(4, 3,Fl3, µ34)
←−−−−−−−−−−U4 broadcasts
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− (Fl4, µ41,
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− µ42, µ43, µ44)
gdh key(1, 4, gdh key(2, 4, gdh key(3, 4, gdh key(4, 4,
Fl4, µ41) Fl4, µ42) Fl4, µ43) Fl4, µ44)
accept← 1 accept← 1 accept← 1 accept← 1
Fig. 4. Algorithm Setup. A practical example with 4 players I = {U1, U2, U3, U4}.
as gdh key(2, 6, gx4x6 , µ31) and gdh key(4, 6, gx2x6 , µ32), respectively5. Here the
session key is computed from the common secret gx2x4x6 .
4.6 Remove(I,J )
This algorithm consists of a down-flow only (see Figure 5). Let n be the size of I and
m be the size of I\J . The group controller GC(I ′) of the new set I ′ = I\J invokes
gdh picks?(I ′m) to get a new private exponent and then gdh down again(I ′m,Fl′)
where Fl′ is the saved previous broadcast; the function makes use of both exponents
(the newly generated one and the old one) but erases the old one at the end. GC(I ′)
obtains a new set of intermediate values from which it simply deletes the elements
related to the removed players (in the set J ) and updates the multicast group to
be I ′. This produces the new broadcast flow Flm with some tags µ1, . . . , µm. Upon
5To be correct, the function gdh key(·) takes as a third input the entire set of values Fl, but here
we wrote only the value that the player is going to use, to make the mechanism clearer.
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Smart
AM 1 AM 2 Cards AM 3 AM 4
holds s1 holds s2 holds s3 holds s4
l l l l
Secure
KEM 1 KEM 2 Co-pro- KEM 3 KEM 4
holds x1 ∈ Z?q holds x2 ∈ Z?q cessors holds x3 ∈ Z?q holds x4 ∈ Z?q
gdh picks?(3)
→ x′3
l l l l
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
accept← 0 accept← 0 accept← 0 accept← 0
Previous set of values is Fl4 = {I, gx2x3x4 , gx1x3x4 , gx1x2x4 , gx1x2x3}
gdh down again(3,Fl4)
(Fl′3,µ31,µ33)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
gdh key(1, 3,Fl′3, µ31) gdh key(3, 3,Fl
′
3, µ33)
New set of values is Fl′3 = (I\J , {g
x′3
24 , g
x1
24 }), where g24 = gx2x4
accept← 1 accept← 1
Fig. 5. Algorithm Remove. A practical example with 4 players: I = {U1, U2, U3, U4} and J =
{U2, U4}. The new multicast group is I = {U1, U3} and GC = U3.
receiving the down-flow, ΠtI′i invokes gdh key(I
′
i, I ′m,Flm, µi) and gets back the
session key sktI′i (and accepts the session). Here, is the reason why an oracle must
store its private exponent and only erase its internal data when it leaves the group.
To illustrate this, assume U6 wishes to leave the group built in the previous ex-
ample. The new multicast group is now I ′ = {Πt2,Πt4}. The group controller for I ′
is Πt4. It first chooses a new exponent x
′
4 without erasing the previous x4. From the
saved broadcast Fl′ = (I, {gx4x6 , gx2x6 , gx2x4}), and using gdh down again(4,Fl′)
it generates a “full” new broadcast {gx′4x6 , gx2x6 , gx2x′4} from which it deletes the
term to be used by Πt6 (the leaving member). The new broadcasted values are
thus Fl2 = (I ′, {gx′4x6 , gx2x6}), together with some authenticators µ1, µ2. The other
player Πt2 can recover the common secret g
x2x
′
4x6 with its old exponent x2: that is,
it does not have to pick a new exponent. Also note that the leaving player “left”
its own exponent in the common secret, but cannot use it to get the session key.
4.7 Join(I,J )
This algorithm also consists of the two stages: up-flow and down-flow (see Figure 6).
Let n be the size of I andm be the size of I∪J . On the up-flow, the group controller
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Smart
AM 1 AM 2 Cards AM 3 AM 4
holds s1 holds s2 holds s3 holds s4
l l l l
Secure
KEM 1 KEM 2 Co-pro- KEM 3 KEM 4
holds x1 ∈ Z?q holds x2 ∈ Z?q cessors holds x3 ∈ Z?q
gdh picks?(3) gdh picks(4)
→ x′′3 → x′4
l l l l
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
accept← 0 accept← 0 accept← 0 accept← 0
Previous set of values is Fl′3 = {I, gx2x
′
3x4 , gx1x2x4}
gdh up again(3, 4,Fl′3, µ′33)
(Fl′′3 ,µ
′′
34)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
gdh down(4, 3,Fl′′3 , µ′′34)
U4 broadcasts (Fl
′
4, µ
′
41, µ43, µ44) ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
New set of values is Fl′4 = {I ∪ J , g
x′′3 x
′
4
24 , g
x1x
′
4
24 , g
x1x
′′
3
24 }, where g24 = gx2x4
gdh key(1, 4,Fl′4, µ41) gdh key(3, 4,Fl
′
4, µ43) gdh key(4, 4,Fl
′
4, µ44)
accept← 1 accept← 1 accept← 1
Fig. 6. Algorithm Join. A practical example with 4 players: I = {U1, U3}, J = {U4} and
GC = U3. The new multicast group is I = {U1, U3, U4}.
GC(I) of the old group invokes gdh picks?(In), and then gdh up again(In, j,Fl′)
where Fl′ and j = ΠtJ1 are respectively the saved previous broadcast and the index
of the first joining player. It updates I into I ′, and forwards the result to the
first joining player. From that point in the execution, the protocol works as the
algorithm Setup, where the (temporary) group controller of the new group I ′ =
I ∪ J is the highest index player in J , that is ΠtJ|J | : the joining players will use
gdh up until the group controller; the latter will use gdh down to perform the
broadcast.
Again, to illustrate this, assume U1 and U3 wish to join the group built in the
previous example. The new multicast group is now I ′ = {Πt1,Πt2,Πt3,Πt4}. The
group controller for I was Πt4. So it first chooses a new exponent x′′4 without eras-
ing the previous x′4. From the saved broadcast Fl
′′ = (I, {gx′4x6 , gx2x6}), and us-
ing gdh up again(4, 1,Fl′′) it generates a “fresh” up-flow Fl2 = (I ′, {gx′′4 x6 , gx2x6 ,
gx2x
′′
4 x6}) together with µ23, and forwards these values to Πt1. Then Πt1 picks x1
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and, using gdh up(1, 4, 3,Fl2, µ23), produces Fl3 = (I ′, {gx1x′′4 x6 , gx1x2x6 , gx2x′′4 x6 ,
gx1x2x
′′
4 x6}) and µ34. The latter picks x3 and, using gdh down(3, 1,Fl3, µ34), gen-
erates the broadcasted values {gx1x3x′′4 x6 , gx1x2x3x6 , gx2x3x′′4 x6 , gx1x2x′′4 x6}.
5. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY
In this section, we assert that the protocol AKE1 securely establishes a session key.
We refine the notion of forward-secrecy to take into account two modes of corruption
and use it to define two notions of security. We show that when considering the
standard corruption mode the protocol AKE1 is secure under standard assumptions.
This proof can in turn be adapted to cope with the strong-corruption mode.
5.1 Security Results
A theorem asserting the security of some protocol measures how much computation
and interactions helps the adversary. One sees that AKE1 is a secure AKE protocol
provided that the adversary does not solve the group decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem G-DDH, or forges an authentication tag. These terms can be made
negligible by appropriate choice of parameters for the group G and authentication
mechanisms. The other terms can also be made “negligible” by an appropriate
instantiation of the key derivation functions.
Theorem 4 – AKE Security in the Standard Corruption Model. Let
A be an adversary against protocol P , running in time T , allowed to make at most
Q queries (Setup, Join, Remove, Send, Corruptam). The adversary is also restricted
to not ask Corruptkem-queries. Let n be the number of players (among the N total
number of players) involved in the operations which lead to the group on which A
makes the Test-query. Then we have:
AdvakeP (A) ≤ 2nQ · AdvgddhΓG (T ′) + 2N(N − 1) · Succcmaauth(T,Q) + 2nQ · δ
where δ denotes the distance between the output of KDF(·) and the uniform distri-
bution over {0, 1}`, T ′ ≤ T +QnTexp(k), where Texp(k) is the time of computation
required for an exponentiation modulo a k-bit number, and Γ = En corresponds to
the elements adversary A can possibly learn (the extended trigon, see Figure 2):
En =
⋃
1≤j≤n−2
⋃
1≤k≤j
{ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ j, i 6= k}}
∪
⋃
1≤k<l≤n
{ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= k, l}} ∪ ⋃
1≤k≤n
{ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= k}}
Note 1. If the authentication means is a signature scheme (the verification is
independent of the recipient), the security result becomes
AdvakeP (A) ≤ 2nQ · AdvgddhΓG (T ′) + 2N · Succcmasign(T,Q) + 2nQ · δ.
Furthermore, we assume we know n, the number of players involved in the oper-
ations which lead to the group on which A makes the Test-query. It is indeed not
a uniform reduction, but with an additional linear factor N , the reduction can be
made uniform, first guessing n.
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When we talk about the “players involved in the operations which lead to the
group on whichAmakes the Test-query”, we mean a player an instance of whom has
joined the group at least once since its setup. As an illustrative example, assume
a multicast group is initialized by Setup(Πt2,Π
t
4,Π
t
6), then Π
t
6 leaves, then Π
s
1,Π
s
3
join, and the Test-query is asked to any of them Πs1,Π
t
2,Π
s
3,Π
t
4. Then the number
of players that have been involved so far is n = 5, even if the size of the Test-ed
group is 4. Note that we have n ≤ N : a player which joins, leaves, then joins again
is counted only once (though different instances of him have to be considered).
5.2 Proof of the Main Theorem
Let A be an adversary that can get an advantage ² in breaking the AKE security of
protocol P within time t, assuming n players have been involved in the protocol.
Let b and b′ be defined as in Section 3, namely the bit underlying the answer to the
Test-query and the bit output by the adversary, respectively. We denote the event
b = b′ by Guess.
5.2.1 Proof overview. Intuitively, and in order to reduce the security to the
G-DDH-problem, the flows sent by the players’ instances in the crucial session
(the one in which the session key will be Test-ed) will be somehow “replaced” by
the lines of the extended trigon D (so that distinguishing the key from a random
value corresponds to solving the G-DDH-problem). This replacement is viewed as
successive modifications to the original game: we incrementally define a sequence
of games starting at G0 and ending up at G5. We define in the execution of Gi−1
and Gi a certain “bad” event Ei and show that as long as Ei does not occur the
two games are identical6; bounding the probability that the “bad” event happens
helps in relating successive games. In our proof the difficulty consists in replacing
the flows with simulated values without changing the adversary’s view “too much”.
In our model, the adversary’s capabilities are viewed as queries. These queries
are answered by a simulator ∆. First of all, one may notice that Setup, Join and
Remove-queries are essentially similar to Send-queries: in every case, an oracle in-
stance is activated and must generate an outgoing message to either start a protocol
execution or to continue it. Then the role of ∆, on receiving such kind of query, is
to simulate the correct outgoing flow. The Corrupt-query is also straightforward to
simulate by having ∆ choosing all authentication keys by itself. The Reveal-query
is the really problematic one, as soon as flows are simulated using values for which
the discrete logarithm is not known (from the G-DDH instance).
Also, in order to answer the queries, the simulator ∆ will make use of several
auxiliary inputs: in particular it will use two integers c0 and i0 (that will be intro-
duced in game G2) as well as an instance D of size n of the G-DDH problem: D is
drawn according to the distribution GDH?Γ (this auxiliary data will be introduced
in game G3), or GDH$Γ (when we move to the game G4), where Γ = En. The
integers c0 and i0 will help ∆ to embed D’s lines at the right place and at the right
moment. For simplicity, we informally present the auxiliary inputs here, but they
will be formally defined only in the games in which they are necessary. Before those
6This technique has been formalized by Shoup [Shoup 2001]. The point is in choosing the “bad”
event.
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games, ∆ simply ignores them.
5.2.2 Detailed proof. We now describe each successive game. The core of the
proof is in game G3, in which ∆ actually uses instance D to replace the real flows
with the simulated ones.
Game G0. This game G0 is the real attack Gameake(A, P ), where ∆ simulates
all the players and then all the queries knowing the authentication keys, and choos-
ing the random coins. At the beginning of this game we set the bit b at random.
By definition, we have:
AdvakeP (A) = 2Pr[Guess0]− 1 (1)
Game G1. The game G1 is identical to G0 except that we abort if a forgery for
the authentication mechanism is detected before any Corrupt-query: this happens
when a valid tag appears in a flow (say, the adversary asks a Send(Π, (Fl, µ)) query,
with Auth.Ver(Fl, µ) = 1), while the pair (Fl, µ) has not been produced by any
instance (i.e., was not generated by ∆ itself in answer to a previous query). We
define the forgery event Forge. Using a well-know lemma we get:
|Pr[Guess0]− Pr[Guess1]| ≤ Pr[Forge]. (2)
Lemma 5 – Probability of Event Forge.
Pr[Forge] ≤ N(N − 1)× Succcmaauth(T ). (3)
Proof. The proof uses a standard hybrid argument.
In this protocol, all the flows are authenticated by the sender. When the forgeries
are excluded, active attacks are excluded too: only replay attacks are still possible.
Of course, the adversary can also delay or reorder messages, then ∆ only handle
them if they are still meaningful: since they are signed, it knows which exponents
they contain.
Game G2. GameG2 is the same as gameG1 except that we make the simulation
abort if certain conditions are not satisfied. Once the simulation does not abort
(this implying a loss in the probabilities), we are thus ensured that the conditions
are indeed satisfied in the next games. The reason why we abort might appear
unclear in this game (indeed, there are purely formal here), but will become clear
in the future games.
More precisely, we make use of the simulator’s auxiliary input: a random index
i0 ∈ [1, n] and a random integer c0 ∈ [1, Q]. The value c0 is a guess for the number
of operations that will occur before the Test-ed session is built (remind that Q is
an upper-bound for the total number of queries), while i0 is a guess for the player
instance who will send the broadcast flow of the “Test-ed” session. More precisely,
it is its order in the list of the involved players in the series of operations that lead
to the Test-ed group. Intuitively, c0 and i0 are thought to be as follows: if the
c0-th operation7 is Join or Setup, then the simulator hopes that the i0-th player
7By the “k-th operation”, one means the k-th operation (Setup, Join or Remove) that has been
initiated by A for building the Test-ed group. In a concurrent setting, the original groups continue
to live whenever a membership change initiates a new group, and therefore a tree structure appears
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involved will be the last joining player, otherwise the simulator hopes it will be
the group controller’s index. In the execution of the game, if the Test-ed session is
not the one completed with the c0-th operation, or if the corresponding broadcast
flow is not operated by the i0-th player, the simulator outputs “Fail” and sets b′
randomly. Let E2 be the event that these guesses are not correct. It can be noticed
that the value c0 and i0 are chosen uniformly and at random in [1, Q] and [1, N ]
respectively. The probability of E2 is thus 1 − 1/NQ. Using the fact that E2 and
Guess1 are independent, we have:
Pr[Guess2] = Pr[Guess2 |E2] Pr[E2] + Pr[Guess2 | ¬E2] Pr[¬E2]
=
1
2
Pr[E2] + Pr[Guess1] (1− Pr[E2])
Pr[E2] = 1− 1
NQ
Therefore,
Pr[Guess2]− 12 =
1
NQ
(
Pr[Guess1]− 12
)
. (4)
Game G3. Game G3 is the same as game G2 except that we slightly modify
the way the queries made by A are answered; for this reason, we will use the fact
that the guesses in game G2 were correct: the Test-ed session is built by the c0-th
operation and the corresponding broadcast has been sent by the i0-th player. Based
on this information, ∆ can correctly make use of the instance D to build the flows
and answer the queries. Recall that the simulator ∆ gets as an auxiliary input an
instance D of size n from GDH?Γ, where Γ is the extended trigon En.
Formally, the instance D plus its solution can be rewritten using the “lines”, as
follows.
D = View∗En(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
= {S1, S2(x1, x2), . . . , Sn−2(x1, . . . , xn−2), Sn−1(x1, . . . , xn−2, xn−1),
Sn(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, xn)} ∪ {gx1...xn}
wherein:
—S1 = {g};
—for 2 ≤ j ≤ n− 2 and j = n, Sj(x1, x2, . . . , xj−1, xj) is the set of all the g
Q
k xk ,
where k respectively enumerates the j − 1-tuples one can build from {1, . . . , j};
—but Sn−1(x1, x2, . . . , xn−2, xn−1) is the set of all the g
Q
k xk , where k respectively
enumerates the n − 2 tuples one can build from {1, . . . , n} (and not only from
{1, . . . , n− 1}, as above, hence the extension).
Main ideas of this game. We now show how, based on the two values i0 and c0,
the simulator is able to simulate the game many randomized instances, generated
by (multiplicative) random self-reduction, from GDH?Γ such that the Test-ed key is
(a known power of) the GDH secret value gx1...xn relative to D. That is all the
where nodes are the groups: a new operation creates a child. The value k is thus the depth of the
Test-ed group.
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elements of Sn (except the ones which correspond to removed players) will have
been embedded into the protocol during the c0-th operation, which leads to the
Test-ed group.
The basic principle is that, whenever a Setup operation (for the Join and Remove
operations, the technique follows similarly) is initiated on a group I, ∆ uses line
S1 for the first up-flow (which is always the same), S2(x1, x2) for the second one,
etc. If the cardinality of I is greater than n− 1, subsequent players instances will
be simulated using exponents yi chosen by ∆ itself, so that it can still compute the
further session keys, from Sn−1(x1, x2, . . . , xn−2, xn−1) and the known yi. While
doing so, ∆ maintains a list L (history) of involved players in I as well as the
associations between the first n players in I and the indices of embedded exponent
xi, and between additional players and known exponents yi. Indeed, for all the
known and unknown exponents, the simulation must remain consistent, and always
use the same exponent for an instance. More precisely, for each group constructed,
or under construction (when an operation has been initiated), a sub-list of triples
is maintained: the triples are of the form (i, j, x), where i is the index of the
player (at most one triple exists for each player in a sub-list), j is the index of the
embedded exponent xj or ⊥ if no exponent is embedded. In the former case, x is
the randomization of xj (see below), and in the latter case, x is the known exponent
yi.
Random self-reducibility. In order to handle concurrent executions of the pro-
tocol, ∆ makes use of the (multiplicative) random self-reducibility of the GDH
problem: any new instance with index i in the list L use a new randomized ex-
ponent x′i = rixi. To that goal, ∆ stores in list L, as many sublists as there
are existing groups; and in each of these sublists, it stores up to n of these ran-
dom “blinding” exponents ri that keep trace of how the random self-reducibility
was applied to the input instance D = ViewEn(x1, x2, . . . , xn) to get the new one
D′ = ViewEn(r1x1, r2x2, . . . , rnxn), specific to the current group. More precisely,
each time (an instance of) a player is assumed to pick at random a private expo-
nent, ∆ proceeds as follows. If the player’s instance is associated (through list L)
to an unknown exponent xi, a random ri is chosen in Z?q and stored, meaning that
random self-reducibility is to be applied to D by (formally) replacing xi with rixi;
if the player is not associated with any GDH exponent, a random, fresh exponent
yi is chosen in Z?q and stored in L. Of course, when a player instance is requested
(by the protocol) to re-use a previous private exponent, ∆ does not pick anything,
but use L to perform the adequate computation, using the adequate elements from
instance D.
Since ∆ knows the authentication keys, and with the specific form of the extended
trigon, ∆ can easily simulate answers to all the queries: a new exponent is either a
new randomized exponent x′i = rixi for an unknown xi from D or a chosen yi, the
flows can be generated from the lines Si and the random values r1, . . . , rn stored in
L. But some subtleties have to be detailed:
First difficulty. If, ∆ embeds all the elements of Sn into the protocol execution
the first time the size of the multicast group is n, ∆ is not able to compute the
session key value sk needed to answer to the Reveal-queries that can occur before c0.
More exactly, ∆ would have then to use the value gx1···xn , but we want to avoid this
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before c0, in order to reduce the security to distinguishing this value from random.
Second difficulty. ∆ needs to know in advance which player instance will send
the last broadcast, in order not to embed the value gx1···xn prematurely in the flows
themselves; this value must be embedded in the Test-ed session key only. Without
caution, in particular if the i0-th player is involved in the group at some time
but then leave the group, we do not want that this temporary membership leads to
embedding an exponent of instance D; this player must be simulated using instance
D at the c0-th operation only. Otherwise there may be n unknown exponents x1
through xn embedded in the view and the secret value may be exposed in one of
the flows.
Third difficulty. Assuming we manage to embed the GDH instance D exactly
on time, when the Test-query is asked, and not before. One difficulty remains if
we want to be able to perform the simulation. In effect, after having received a
challenge (the answer to the Test-query), the adversary may continue to initiate
some operations before terminating; if we do not want to expose the value gx1···xn
during these future sessions, we need to be able to “go backward” and to simulate
the flows with less than n exponents again.
How to overcome these points. In light of the previously identified difficulties,
one can summarize the strategy of ∆ as follows:
Embed the successive elements of instance D (after some randomization)
in the protocol flows in the order wherein the players join the group, until
n − 1 players have been involved and except for instances of the i0-th
player; during the c0-th operation (creation of the Test-ed group), embed
the last elements of instance D via the broadcast operated (hopefully) by
the i0-th player; and after that operation, simulate the flows using line
Sn−1 only, with session keys in line Sn.
This last point, however, leads us to consider the extended trigon rather than the
basic one, simply because we cannot know in advance which (n− 1)-tuple of expo-
nents will be involved in future session simulations.
We now show this strategy allows ∆ to deal with situations where n players
are involved in the group before c0, and are added and removed repeatedly. To
prevent all the exponents xi to be embedded prematurely, it is sufficient to prevent
one single player of using such exponents, by simulating this player with a private
exponent yi that ∆ chooses by itself. But in order to have all the exponents involved
in the session key of the Test-ed group, it is necessary to know who will be the last
player to contribute (that is, which player will broadcast the last down-flow). Thus
the “guess” made on a player index i0.
Detailed steps of the simulation. We give some more details on what ∆ is doing
at each step: before c0, at c0, after c0. We will make intensive use of two counters k
and η, specific to each group: any operation Setup, Join or Remove initiates a new
group, and then each group structure owns counters k and η. In case of a Setup
operation, the counters k and η are initialized to 0, for the two other operations,
the new group keep the same values for k and η as the previous group.
First, at any time, and for any operation different from the c0 + 1-th:
—for any new player Ui (never involved since the last Setup), if the index k < n−1
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and η 6= i0− 1, ∆ increments both k and i0, picks a randomizer rk and thus uses
x′k = rkxk as exponent for this player. The tuple (i, k, rk) is stored in L for this
group. This tuple will never be removed, even when the player leaves the group,
but may be updated.
This way, the up-flow or the broadcast flow involves a random self-reduction of
the k-th line in the basic trigon: Sk(r1x1, . . . rkxk) where all elements are put to
power
∏
yi for all the (i,⊥, yi) in L for this group. Similarly, the session key is
derived from one element from the k + 1-th line (where k + 1 ≤ n).
—for any new player Ui (never involved since the last Setup), when the index k
is already equal to n − 1, or η = i0 − 1, ∆ increments i0 and picks a random
exponent yi for this player. The tuple (i,⊥, yk) is stored in L for this group. This
tuple will never be removed, even when the player leaves the group, but may be
updated.
This case is to ensure that we are not going to use (random self-reduced) line Sn
of the trigon prematurely.
—for a player Ui already involved since the last Setup, one can get (i, k, y) from L.
In the case k = ⊥, x′k = yk = y can be used again, unless a new random has to
be picked up. In such a case, ∆ picks a new random exponent y′k and thus uses
x′′k = y
′
k as exponent for this player. The tuple (i,⊥, y′k) is used for updating L
for this group.
Otherwise, x′k = rkxk can be used again, unless a new random has to be picked
up. In such a case, ∆ picks a new randomizer r′k and thus uses x
′′
k = r
′
kxk as
exponent for this player. The tuple (i, k, r′k) is used for updating L for this group.
When the c0-th operation occurs, the last broadcast flow is operated by the above
i0-th player, who now embeds some elements from the line Sn of the trigon; this
means, in particular, that this player is always associated to the last exponent of
instance D. It follows that the corresponding session key (which is the Test-ed
key) is the G-CDHΓ value gx1...xn relative to D, blinded by some (known) random
exponents: all the ri and the yi. ∆ then answers the Test-query as in the real
protocol, according to the value of bit b.
After c0, however, ∆ also needs to be able to answer to all queries and more
specifically the Reveal-queries (adversary A may keep playing the game for more
rounds). More precisely, we want ∆ to do so without using the secret GDH value
gx1···xn . To this aim, ∆ has to un-embed the elements of Sn from the protocol (in
order to reduce the number of exponents taken from the instance D) and it does it
in the operation that occurs at c0 + 1.
Technically speaking, this is feasible by having the initiator of the c0 + 1-th
operation choose a fresh private exponent yi (and not simply blind his corresponding
exponent in the instance D with a fresh randomizer). However depending on which
player8 performs that operation, ∆ may not be able to do it without going “out”
of the basic trigon (but anyway with only n − 1 exponents involved). This is the
reason why the line Sn−1 has to contain all the possible (n − 2)-tuples: extension
of the basic trigon.
8Note this is not obviously (an instance of) the i0-th player, even if the latter did perform the
previous broadcast.
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Therefore, for any player Ui initiating the c0 + 1-th operation, ∆ decrements k,
picks a random exponent yi for this player. The tuple (i,⊥, yk) is used to update
L for this group.
This way, the up-flow or the broadcast flow involves a random self-reduction of
the n − 1-th line in the extended trigon and the session key is derived from one
element from the n-th line.
For all the subsequent operations (before a new Setup), k = n − 1 and thus ∆
will use random private exponents for all the players, keeping all the xi but one
in the flows9. Therefore, the future session keys will still be derived from the n-th
line, but the broadcasts may involve any element in the extended n− 1-th line.
5.2.3 A comprehensive example of simulation. Here we provide a complete ex-
ample of how ∆ can correctly handle a set of executions of the protocol, according
to the strategy described above. We represent the simulation by ∆ in the case n = 4
and according to the following “guesses”: c0 = 4, i0 = 2. The instance D is {(),
(gx1 , gx2), (gx1x2 , gx1x2 , gx2x3), (gx1x2x3 , gx1x2x4 , gx1x3x4 , gx2x3x4)}. Players’ private
exponents which are fully simulated by ∆ are denoted yi, will the randomizers are
denoted ri. We note that U2 (who performs the broadcast in the crucial session)
will be associated with unknown exponent x4 at that time only. Before that, U2
is associated to a fully-controlled exponent y2. As a consequence, indices are a bit
tricky to follow, since U1 is associated with x1, U3 with x2 and U4 with x3 (but y4
after the crucial query).
Setup{U1, U2, U3} c = 1, I = {1, 2, 3}
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
g, gr1x1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ g
y2 , gr1x1 , gr1x1y2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
gy2r2x2 , gr1x1r2x2 , gr1x1y2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SK = (gx1x2)r1r2y2 is known to ∆
The adversary first builds a group with the following successive queries: Setup{U1,
U2, U3}, Send(U2,m1), Send(U3,m2), Send(U1,m3), Send(U2,m3). To answer the
first query, ∆ simulates player U1, associating his values with the first term gx1 in
instance D; that is ∆ add (1, 1, r1) to the first sublist; it can thus construct the
message m1, which is made of the first flow and the appropriate authentication
data. Then the adversary asks Send(U2,m1). The simulator processes this query
as follows: since the player being simulated is Ui0 but this Setup is not the c0-th
operation, U2 is simulated with a fully controlled exponent: ∆ chooses y2 by itself
and add (2,⊥, y2) to the current sublist. Finally, when the generated flow m2 is
sent to U3 via the appropriate query, ∆ processes it by associating U3 with the
second term of instance D (modulo some known randomizer r3): the tuple (3, 2, r2)
9Another solution would have been to guess which player performs the operation at c0 +1. With
this second guess j0, the extension of the trigon would have contained all the n − 2 tuples but
those containing both i0 and j0.
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is added to the sublist. The computed broadcast can thus be addressed to U1 and
U2 (simulation is straightforward there). The sublist for this execution is then:
{(1, 1, r1), (2,⊥, y2), (3, 2, r2)}.
Remove{U2} c = 2, I = {1, 3}
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
gy2r
′
2x2 , gr1x1y2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SK = (gx1x2)r1r
′
2y2 is known to ∆
To remove a player from the existing group, the adversary first asks a Remove{U2}
query. The simulator can easily simulates the group controller to build a well-
formed broadcast: indeed, ∆ just refreshes the randomizer for U3. The sublist for
this group then becomes {(1, 1, r1), (2,⊥, y2), (3, 2, r′2)}. The broadcast is sent to
U1 via a Send-query, and that latter is easily processed by ∆ to compute the session
key from gx1x2 and the data in L = {(1, 1, r1), (2,⊥, y2), (3, 2, r′2)}.
Join{U4} c = 3, I = {1, 3, 4}
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
gy2r
′′
2 x2 , gr1x1y2 , gr1x1y2r
′′
2 x2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
gy2r
′′
2 x2r3x3 , gr1x1y2r3x3 , gr1x1y2r
′′
2 x2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SK = (gx1x2x3)r1r
′′
2 r3y2 is known to ∆
In this step the adversary add a new player to the group, with Join{U4}. The
simulator ∆ will thus generate flows that will be sent successively from U3 (the group
controller) to U4 (the joining player) and thereafter broadcasted by U4 (newly group
controller) to all other members. The up-flow is computed by ∆ using a refreshed
randomizer r′′2 and the broadcast is constructed by associating U4 to the next term
of instance D: thus a tuple (4, 3, r3) will be added to the sublist. The sublist
representing this execution is L = {(1, 1, r1), (2,⊥, y2), (3, 2, r′′2 ), (4, 3, r3)}. Here
we can see the aforementioned first difficulty: if we had (in the Setup operation)
associated U2 with a term of the GDH instance, the session key here would have
involved the secret value gx1x2x3x4 , and ∆ would have not be able to answer a
possible Reveal-query.
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Join{U2} c = 4, I = {1, 2, 3, 4}
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
gy2r
′′
2 x2r
′
3x3 , gr1x1y2r
′
3x3←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
gr1x1y2r
′′
2 x2 , gr1x1y2r
′′
2 x2r
′
3x3
U4
Test-query guessed now
gr4x4r
′′
2 x2r
′
3x3 , gr1x1r
′′
2 x2r
′
3x3 , gr1x1r4x4r
′
3x3 , gr1x1r4x4r
′′
2 x2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
broadcast sent by U2
SK = (gx1x2x3x4)r1r
′′
2 r
′
3r4 is derived from the DH secret
Note that c = c0 = 4. Here U2 joins the group again. Before this step, it was
not associated with one exponent xi from D, to prevent premature exposure of
the GDH secret. However this time, the simulator has to inject the last exponent:
player U2 will thus be associated with the last exponent x4, and the current sublist
will contain a tuple (2, 4, r4). Note that, knowing the value of y2, the simulator
was able to remove it when injecting x4 instead. The scenario illustrates the afore
mentioned second difficulty: why ∆ needs to guess which player will perform the
crucial broadcast. In effect the up-flow sent by U4 (current group controller) to
U2 (joining member) must not contain the last exponent x4, otherwise the secret
GDH value is exposed. Thus Ui0 is the only player that can be associated with x4
in the Test-ed session. Consequently his identity must have been guessed before in
order to perform a special treatment in earlier sessions. The current sublist here is
{(1, 1, r1), (2, 4, r4), (3, 2, r′′2 ), (4, 3, r′3)}.
Remove{U1, U2} c = 5, I = {3, 4}
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
gr1x1r4x4y4 , gr1x1r4x4r
′′
2 x2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SK = (gx1x2x4)r1r
′′
2 r4y4 is known to ∆ again
This scenario explains the third difficulty: why the instance D must follow the
“extended trigon” distribution. Because the c0 + 1-th operation removes U2 from
the group (thus making him inactive), ∆ cannot update in the sublist the tuple
(2, 4, r4) which is relative to U2; the only exponent that can be refreshed is that
of the group controller U4 when sending the broadcast. This means that ∆ will
dissociate U4 from the unknown (randomized) exponent x3 and use a fully controlled
exponent y4 instead. As a consequence, a term derived from gx1x4 appears in the
broadcast, and that is why ∆ needs the extended trigon as his auxiliary input
(remind that no such term appears in the basic trigon). The sublist used by ∆ is
{(1, 1, r1), (2, 4, r4), (3, 2, r′′2 ), (4,⊥, y4)}.
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Join{U2} c = 6, I = {2, 3, 4}
U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4
gr1x1r4x4y
′
4 , gr1x1r4x4r
′′
2 x2 , gr1x1r4x4r
′′
2 x2y
′
4←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− U4
gr1x1r
′′
2 x2y
′
4 , gr1x1r
′
4x4y
′
4 , gr1x1r
′
4x4r
′′
2 x2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
SK = (gx1x2x4)r1r
′′
2 r
′
4y
′
4 is known to ∆
This last operation is mainly for completeness. From now on, the simulator
will never use exponent x3 again: only terms derived from x1, x2 and x4 will be
used (with session keys derived from the (known) value gx1x2x4). Therefore, when
simulating the answers to the queries for U2, ∆ simply refreshes the randomizer r4;
the corresponding sublist is {(1, 1, r1), (2, 4, r′4), (3, 2, r′′2 ), (4,⊥, y′4)}.
The simulation is therefore indistinguishable from the game G2:
Pr[Guess2] = Pr[Guess3]. (5)
Game G4. Game G4 is the same as game G3 except that the simulator is now
given as an auxiliary input an instance D of size n from GDH$Γ, where Γ is the
extended trigon En:
D = View$En(x1, x2, . . . , xn, r)
= {S1, S2(x1, x2), . . . , Sn−2(x1, . . . , xn−2), Sn−1(x1, . . . , xn−2, xn−1),
Sn(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, xn)} ∪ {gr}
Therefore, in case b = 1, it uses the value gr to answer the Test-query. Note
this value is used only to answer the Test-query and is never used elsewhere in
the simulation described above. In such game, the Reveal-queries can be answered
exactly the same way as in the previous game. Straightforwardly, distinguishing
between games G3 and G4 is at most as hard as solving the G-DDHΓ-problem:
|Pr[Guess3]− Pr[Guess4]| ≤ AdvgddhΓG (T ′). (6)
The running time of simulator in games G3 and G4 is essentially the same as in the
first game, except that each query may imply computation of up to n exponentiation
needed for the multiplicative random self-reducibility: T ′ ≤ T + nQTexp(k), where
Texp(k) is the time needed to perform an exponentiation modulo a k-bit number.
Game G5. Game G5 is the same as G4, except that the Test-query is answered
with a completely random value, independently of b. It is then straightforward
that Pr[Guess5] = 1/2. Let δ be the distance between the output of KDF(·) and the
uniform distribution, we have:
|Pr[Guess5]− Pr[Guess4]| ≤ δ. (7)
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5.2.4 Conclusion. Putting all together equations (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), we
get
Pr[Guess0] = Pr[Guess0 ∧ Forge] + Pr[Guess0 ∧ ¬Forge] ≤ Pr[Forge] + Pr[Guess1]
≤ Pr[Forge] + nQ
(
Pr[Guess2]− 12
)
+
1
2
≤ Pr[Forge] + nQ
(
Pr[Guess5] + Adv
gddhΓ
G (T ) + δ −
1
2
)
+
1
2
≤ Pr[Forge] + nQ
(
Adv
gddhΓ
G (T ) + δ
)
+
1
2
.
The theorem then follows from lemma 5.
Remark. Recall that this proof is considering an adversary that is restricted not
to ask Corruptkem-queries. When dealing with strong-corruption we have to answer
to all the Corruptkem-queries made by the adversary along the games but we can only
do so if we know the private exponents involved in the games —these exponents
must be given to A on Corruption queries—. To reach this aim, we can no longer
benefit from the random self-random reducibility property of G-DDH and have
to “guess” the moments at which the adversary will initiate the operations leading
to the Test-ed group. Unfortunately, reductions carried out in such a way add
an exponential factor in the size of the multicast group: indeed for each of the n
players, we will have to guess (among up to Q messages sent) the flow that will be
involved to build the Test-ed key; the loss in the probability is thus O(Qn).
6. CONCLUSION
In the present paper we have provided a formal model and security definitions, as
well as methods, for authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Our work
should allow cryptographic experts to properly analyze the security of a group
key exchange protocol, to address in a rigorous way the security requirements a
given method aims to achieve, and to come up with provably secure protocols.
The proposed model is sufficiently generic to be adapted to many cryptographic
scenarios well-suited for key exchange in a group.
In addition, we have performed a security analysis a protocol suite already pro-
posed for dynamic group Diffie-Hellman key exchange; we have enhanced it with
authentication services, proposed a modular implementation that can be used to
abstract out the use of cryptographic devices, and exhibit a formal security proof
under standard computational assumptions.
This paper, we hope, will enable security architects to pick a method based not
only on its efficiency but also on its (provable) security.
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A. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2
A.1 Preliminaries
Remind the GDH-distribution associated to a structure Γ made of proper subsets
of In = {1, . . . , n}:
GDHΓ = {DΓ(x1, . . . , xn) |x1, . . . , xn ∈R Zq} ,
where DΓ(x1, . . . , xn) =
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γ
}
.
The γ function denotes the cardinality of any structure Γ:
—for Tn, we have τn = γ(Tn) =
∑n
i=1 i = n(n + 1)/2 since the i-th “line” of this
structure has exactly i elements.
—the cardinality of En is ²n = γ(En) = γ(Tn) +
(
n−2
n
) − n + 1 = n2 − n + 1 since
the extension of the n − 1-th line of this structure has exactly (n−2n ) − (n − 1)
elements.
—it is also worthwhile to mention that the cardinality of the Generalized one is
2n − 2.
The later is exponential in n, while the two others are quadratic.
A.1.1 Good Structure Families. Our goal is to prove that the hardness of the
G-DDHΓ-problem can be reduced to that of the DDH one. Given an indexed
family Γ = {Γn}, we proceed by induction over n: we prove that solving the
G-DDHΓn -problem reduces to solving the G-DDHΓn−1-problem. The intuitive
(and simple) idea is to replace, in an instance of Γn, all occurrences of x1x2 by an
independent variable x12, so that the number of variables decreases by one, while
the computational distance increases by at most Advddh. However, re-mapping the
new variable x12 to a variable in Γn−1 assumes that the subsets defining the Γ family
are well suited for that. To do so, we examine the re-mapping of modified subsets
in Γn into subsets of Γn−1. For any indexed structure Γ = {Γn}n, we consider
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an auxiliary structure Γˆ = {Γˆn}n, where Γˆn is built from the set {0, 3, . . . , n + 1}
in the same way Γn is built from the set In through the map 1 → 0, 2 → 3, . . . ,
n→ n+ 1.
Definition 2 – Good Structure Family. A family Γ = {Γn}n is good if
for any integer n greater than 3 the following four conditions are satisfied:
(1 ) ∀J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} ⊆ J ⇒ J12 ∪ {0} ∈ Γˆn−1
(2 ) ∀J ∈ Γn, 1 /∈ J, 2 ∈ J ⇒ J2 ∈ Γˆn−1
(3 ) ∀J ∈ Γn, 1 ∈ J, 2 /∈ J ⇒ J1 ∈ Γˆn−1
(4 ) ∀J ∈ Γn, 1 /∈ J, 2 /∈ J ⇒ J ∈ Γˆn−1
where for any J , we denote by J1, J2 and J12 the sets J\{1}, J\{2} and J\{1, 2}
respectively.
In other words, this means that
Γn ⊆
{
J0 ∪ {1, 2} J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 ∈ J
}⋃{
J ∪ {2}, J ∪ {1}, J J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 6∈ J
}
,
where for any J , we denote by J0 the set J\{0}.
Note 2. The basic trigon T = {Tn} and extended trigon E = {En} are good
structure families.
Note 3. In [Naor and Reingold 1997] it is proved that the generalized (De-
cisional) Diffie-Hellman problem is polynomially equivalent to DDH. While it is
straightforward that the generalized structure is a good one, we mention that our
generic technique described in this section could not be used to establish such reduc-
tion for the generalized structure, due to the exponential size of that latter.
A.1.2 Group Random Distributions. For proving our result, we need to alter
Group Diffie-Hellman tuples, introducing some randomness. This leads to the group
random (GR) distributions in which some elements are independently random in
the group Diffie-Hellman distributions.
First we split the tuples in two parts:
DΓn(x1, . . . , xn) =
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} * J
}
∪
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} ⊆ J
}
=
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
{1, 2} * J
}
∪
{(
J, gx1x2
Q
j∈J12 xj
)
{1, 2} ⊆ J
}
.
We can now define an additional distribution:
GRΓn = {VΓn(x1, . . . , xn, α) |x1, . . . , xn, α ∈R Zq} ,
where (recall that J12 is the set J\{1, 2})
VΓn(x1, . . . , xn, α) =
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} * J
}
⋃{(
J, gα
Q
j∈J12 xj
)
J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} ⊆ J
}
.
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Similarly to what is done for the Group Diffie-Hellman distributions, we de-
fine the two tuples V?Γn(x1, . . . , xn, α) and V$Γn(x1, . . . , xn, α, r), the extensions ofVΓn(x1, . . . , xn, α) where one appends {(In, gαx3···xn)} and {(In, gr)} respectively.
Then,
GR?Γn =
{V?Γn(x1, . . . , xn, α) |x1, . . . , xn, α ∈R Zq} ,
GR$Γn =
{
V$Γn(x1, . . . , xn, α, r) |x1, . . . , xn, α, r ∈R Zq
}
.
Note 4. We notice that under the constraint α = x1x2, for any x1, . . . , xn, r ∈R
Zq, one would have,
VΓn(x1, . . . , xn, α) = DΓn(x1, . . . , xn)
V?Γn(x1, . . . , xn, α) = D?Γn(x1, . . . , xn)
V$Γn(x1, . . . , xn, α, r) = D$Γn(x1, . . . , xn, r)
and thus,
GRΓn ≡ GDHΓn GR?Γn ≡ GDH?Γn GR$Γn ≡ GDH$Γn .
Definition 3 – Group Random Adversaries. A Group Computational
Random- or (t, ²)-GCRΓn-attacker in G is a probabilistic Turing machine ∆ running
in time t such that
Succ
gcrΓn
G (∆) = Prxi,α
[
∆(VΓn(x1, . . . , xn, α)) = gαx3···xn
] ≥ ².
A Group-Decisional-Random- or (t, ²)-GDRΓn-distinguisher in G is a probabilistic
Turing machine ∆ running in time t such that its advantage Adv
gdrΓn
G (∆) defined
by ∣∣∣∣ Prxi,α [∆(V?Γn(x1, . . . , xn, α)) = 1]− Prxi,α,r [∆(V$Γn(x1, . . . , xn, α, r)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
is greater than ².
A.2 Proof of theorem 1
Now we provide a reduction of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem to
the group Decisional Diffie-Hellman (GDDH) problem, but for the good structure
families only. We first (re)state the theorem more formally.
Theorem 1. Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q and tG the
time needed for an exponentiation in G. For any good structure family Γ = {Γn}n
of cardinality γ = {γn}n and any integer n, we have:
Adv
gddhΓn
G (t) ≤ (2n− 3)AdvddhG (t′) where t′ ≤ t+ tG
n∑
i=3
γi.
The proof results, by induction, from the following two lemmas 6 and 7 which
lead to
Adv
gddhΓn
G (t) ≤ Adv
gddhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG) + 2Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG).
However before to prove it let’s plug in some numerical values for the time of
computation:
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—for the structure of basic trigon Tn, the time t′ is less than t+ n3tG/3;
—for the structure of extended trigon En, the time t′ is less than t+ 2n3tG/3.
Lemma 6 – Relating GDDH and GDR. For any integer n and any struc-
ture Γn, we have
Adv
gddhΓn
G (t) ≤ Adv
gdrΓn
G (t) + 2Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG).
Proof. We consider an adversary A against the G-DDHΓn problem. Such an
adversary, on input a distribution depending on a bit b, replies with a bit b′ which
is a guess for b. We assume that A runs in maximal time t, in particular it always
terminates, even if the input comes from neither GDH?Γn nor from GDH
$
Γn . Then
we define the following two games: G0, G1 and consider the event Si in game Gi
as b = b′.
Game G0. In this game, we are given a Diffie-Hellman triple (A,B,C) = (gx1 ,
gx2 , gx1x2). Then we choose at random (x3, . . . , xn) in Z∗q and compute (within
time O(γntG)) a tuple Un which follows the distribution GDHΓn , as follows
Un =
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γn, 1 /∈ J, 2 /∈ J
}
⋃{(
J,A
Q
j∈J1 xj
)
J ∈ Γn, 1 ∈ J, 2 /∈ J
}
⋃{(
J,B
Q
j∈J2 xj
)
J ∈ Γn, 1 /∈ J, 2 ∈ J
}
⋃{(
J,C
Q
j∈J12 xj
)
J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} ⊆ J
}
.
Then if b = 1, one appends to Un the value Cx3···xn ; and if b = 0, one appends to
Un a value gr, where r is a random exponent: the computed tuple follows exactly
the distribution GDH?Γn (resp. GDH
$
Γn) if b = 1 (resp. b = 0). Thus by definition,
if we feed the attacker A with this tuple, we have
Pr[S0] =
Adv
gddhΓn
G (A) + 1
2
.
Game G1. It is the same as gameG0 except that we are given a tuple (A,B,C) =
(gx1 , gx2 , gα), where α is a random exponent. It is easy to see that the tuple given
to the attacker A follows the distribution GR?Γn (resp. GR$Γn) if b = 1 (resp. b = 0).
Then,
Pr[S1] =
Adv
gdrΓn
G (A) + 1
2
≤ Adv
gdrΓn
G (t) + 1
2
.
Also, the difference in the probability distributions in the two games is upper-
bounded by:
Pr[S0] ≤ Pr[S1] + AdvddhG (t+ γntG).
The lemma follows.
Lemma 7 – Induction Step. For any good structure family Γ = {Γn} and any
integer n, we have
Adv
gdrΓn
G (t) ≤ Adv
gddhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG).
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Proof. We consider a GDRΓn -distinguisher A running in time t and we use it to
built a G-DDHΓn−1-distinguisher. To reach that goal, we receive as input a tuple
drawn from either GDH?Γn−1 or GDH
$
Γn−1 . We use A to guess the underlying bit b.
In the given tuple, we denote by (In−1, un−1) the last value and by Un−1 the first
values of this input tuple:
Un−1 =
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γn−1
}
= DΓn−1(x1, . . . , xn−1) ∈ GDHΓn−1
un−1 = gx1...xn−1 if b = 1, or gr if b = 0.
First, we split the tuple Un−1 in two blocks, depending whether 1 ∈ J :
Un−1 =
{(
J, gx1
Q
j∈J1 xj
)
J ∈ Γn−1, 1 ∈ J
}
∪
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γn−1, 1 /∈ J
}
.
Then we write this tuple by renaming the variables x1, . . . , xn−1 to be respectively
X0, X3, . . . , Xn. It then follows that the elements of Un−1 are indexed by the
elements of Γˆn−1 rather than Γn−1:{(
J, gX0
Q
j∈J0 Xj
)
J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 ∈ J
}
∪
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J Xj
)
J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 /∈ J
}
.
Now we pick at random two values X1, X2 in Z∗q and use them to construct the
following tuple, in which the last block in the above equation is used to derive the
last three blocks of Wn−1:
Wn−1 =
{(
J, gX0
Q
j∈J0 Xj
)
J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 ∈ J
}
⋃{(
J, gX2
Q
j∈J Xj
)
J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 /∈ J
}
⋃{(
J, gX1
Q
j∈J Xj
)
J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 /∈ J
}
⋃{(
J, g
Q
j∈J Xj
)
J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 /∈ J
}
.
Remember that Γ is a “good” structure family:
Γn ⊆
{
J0 ∪ {1, 2} J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 ∈ J
}⋃{
J ∪ {2}, J ∪ {1}, J J ∈ Γˆn−1, 0 6∈ J
}
.
It follows that one can build the following tuple Vn which is also included in Wn−1:
Vn =
{(
J, gX0
Q
j∈J12 Xj
)
J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} ⊆ J
}
⋃{(
J, g
Q
j∈J Xj
)
J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} * J
}
.
We note that
Vn = VΓn(X1, . . . , Xn, X0) ∈ GRΓn .
Then Vn is appended (In, un−1) and given to A. The latter returns a bit b′ that we
relay back as an answer to the original G-DDHΓn−1 problem. The computation
time needed to properly generate Vn from the input Un−1 is at most γntG.
Thus, we have
Adv
gddhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG) ≥ Adv
gdrΓn
G (t).
The lemma follows.
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Putting all together, we obtain:
Adv
gddhΓn
G (t) ≤ Adv
gdrΓn
G (t) + 2Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG)
≤ AdvgddhΓn−1G (t+ γntG) + 2AdvddhG (t+ γntG)
≤ AdvddhG
(
t+
n∑
i=3
γitG
)
+ 2
n∑
i=3
AdvddhG
t+ n∑
j=i
γjtG

≤ (2n− 3)AdvddhG (t′) where t′ ≤ t+ tG
n∑
i=3
γi.
A.3 Proof of theorem 2
Now we show the GCDH is a standard assumption by relating it to both the CDH
and the DDH.
Theorem 2. Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q and tG the
time needed for an exponentiation in G. For any good structure family Γ = {Γn}n
of cardinality γ = {γn}n and any integer n, we have:
Succ
gcdhΓn
G (t) ≤ SucccdhG (t′) + (n− 2)AdvddhG (t′) where t′ ≤ t+
n∑
i=3
γitG.
As for the previous theorem, the result comes, by induction, from both
Succ
gcdhΓn
G (t) ≤ Succ
gcrΓn
G (t) + Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG)
Succ
gcrΓn
G (t) ≤ Succ
gcdhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG).
We consider an adversary A against the G-CDHΓn problem. Such an adversary,
on input a tuple drawn from the GDHΓn distribution, replies with a single value
which is a guess for the corresponding secret. We assume that A runs in maximal
time t, in particular it always terminates, even if the input does not come from
GDHΓn .
We then define a sequence of games G0, G1, . . . . In each game, given a triple
(A,B,C) and n− 2 random elements (x3, . . . , xn) in Z∗q (which are not necessarily
known), we consider Si as the event that the adversary A outputs Cx3···xn .
Game G0. In this game, we are given a Diffie-Hellman triple (A,B,C) = (gx1 ,
gx2 , gx1x2). Then by randomly choosing (x3, . . . , xn) we can compute:
Un =
{(
J, g
Q
j∈J xj
)
J ∈ Γn, 1 /∈ J, 2 /∈ J
}
⋃{(
J,A
Q
j∈J1 xj
)
J ∈ Γn, 1 ∈ J, 2 /∈ J
}
⋃{(
J,B
Q
j∈J2 xj
)
J ∈ Γn, 1 /∈ J, 2 ∈ J
}
⋃{(
J,C
Q
j∈J12 xj
)
J ∈ Γn, {1, 2} ⊆ J
}
.
It is easy to see that Un = DΓn(x1, . . . , xn), and thus follows exactly the distribution
GDHΓn . Then the tuple Un is provided to the adversary. By definition, since
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, February 2007.
Provably-Secure Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange · 43
Cx3···xn = gx1···xn , we have
Pr[S0] = Succ
gcdhΓn
G (A).
Game G1. It is the same as gameG0 except that we are given a tuple (A,B,C) =
(gx1 , gx2 , gα), where α is a random element in Z∗q . We then perform the same
operations as in game G0 to obtain a tuple which follows the distribution GRΓn :
Un = VΓn(x1, . . . , xn, α). This tuple is provided to the adversary, which computes
gαx3...xn . By definition, we have:
Pr[S1] = Succ
gcrΓn
G (A) ≤ Succ
gcrΓn
G (t).
In both games the computation time needed for generating the tuple from the in-
put a triple (A,B,C) is at most (γn−1)tG where tG is the time required for an expo-
nentiation in G. Another exponentiation is needed to compute Cx3···xn . Clearly the
computational distance between the games is upper-bounded by AdvddhG (t+ γntG),
then:
Succ
gcdhΓn
G (A) ≤ Succ
gcrΓn
G (t) + Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG).
Game G2. It is the same as game G1 except that we choose x1 and x2 by
ourselves. Therefore (A,B,C) = (gx1 , gx2 , gα) where x1 and x2 are known, but α
is not. The remaining of this game is distributed exactly as in the previous one, so
Pr[S2] = Pr[S1].
Game G3. It is the same as game G2 except that we do not know the elements
(x3, . . . , xn). Instead, we are given an instance Un−1 of the G-CDHΓn−1 problem,
built from the (unknown) exponents (α, x3, . . . , xn), where α is the same than the
underlying (hidden) exponent in C. By operating as in the previous section, granted
the property of good structure family, we can complete the given tuple by using x1
and x2 (which are known) to obtain a tuple Vn following the distribution GRΓn .
The variables are distributed exactly as in the previous game, so we have Pr[S3] =
Pr[S2]. Note that since we do not know x3, . . . , xn, we are no longer able to decide
whether the value the adversary outputs is Cx3···xn . But it is not a problem since
the two games are perfectly identical.
Anyway, since Cx3···xn = gαx3···xn is the Diffie-Hellman secret associated to the
given G-CDHΓn−1 instance, the adversary outputs C
x3···xn with probability at
most Succ
gcdhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG):
Pr[S3] ≤ Succ
gcdhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG).
Putting all these together gives us
Pr[S0] = Succ
gcdhΓn
G (A) ≤ Pr[S1] + AdvddhG (t+ γntG)
≤ Pr[S3] + AdvddhG (t+ γntG) ≤ Succ
gcdhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG) + Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG)
Since it is true for any adversary running within time t,
Succ
gcdhΓn
G (t) ≤ Succ
gcdhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG) + Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG).
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By induction, it follows:
Succ
gcdhΓn
G (t) ≤ Succ
gcdhΓn−1
G (t+ γntG) + Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG)
≤ SuccgcdhΓn−2G (t+ (γn + γn−1)tG)
+AdvddhG (t+ (γn + γn−1)tG) + Adv
ddh
G (t+ γntG)
≤ . . .
≤ SucccdhG
(
t+
n∑
i=3
γitG
)
+
n∑
i=3
AdvddhG
t+ n∑
j=i
γjtG

≤ SucccdhG (t′) + (n− 2)AdvddhG (t′) where t′ ≤ t+
n∑
i=3
γitG.
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